tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-38728715713200546092024-03-06T01:10:22.962-08:00Kurdish CulturUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger19125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3872871571320054609.post-85909205740402402422012-01-22T07:23:00.000-08:002012-01-22T07:23:01.643-08:00The Dimili Kurds ( North Kurdistan)<div style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"></div><div style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;">The Kurds are the largest people group who do not have their own homeland. Instead, they are spread across the towering mountains and barren plains of <a href="http://kcm.co.kr/bethany_eng/c_code/turkey.html">Turkey</a>,<a href="http://kcm.co.kr/bethany_eng/c_code/iran.html">Iran</a>, and <a href="http://kcm.co.kr/bethany_eng/c_code/iraq.html">Iraq</a>. This oil-rich area, known as "Kurdistan," was politically divided into three nations after World War II. The Dimili Kurds inhabit the northern edge of Kurdistan in eastern Turkey.</div>The Dimili Kurds differ from other Kurds in primarily two ways: language and religion. Although they speak the Kurdish language, the Dimilis speak their own distinct dialect. Similarly, while most Kurds are Sunni Muslims, the majority of the Dimili Kurds are followers of the <a href="http://kcm.co.kr/bethany_eng/a_code/islam.html">"Alevi Sect" of Islam</a>. Other Kurdish peoples see the Dimilis as being heretics and, as a result, have isolated them from other Kurdish tribes.<br />
<a href="http://kcm.co.kr/bethany/images3/0482.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img alt="[IMAGE]" border="0" src="http://kcm.co.kr/bethany/images3/0482.jpg" /></a>Although most of the Kurds live in Turkey, the Turkish government refuses to recognize them as a separate people. They simply refer to them as the "mountain Turks." Even their basic needs, such as education and land development, are neglected by the government. It is no wonder, then, that the Kurds are a people struggling to maintain their own identity.<br />
<b>What are their lives like?</b><br />
The Dimili Kurds live either grouped together in towns and villages, or as nomadic herdsmen. Their society is dominated by males, but women typically oversee the households.<br />
Traditional clothing for the men includes baggy trousers, plain shirts, jackets wrapped with brightly colored sashes, and colorful turbans. A dagger is worn and thrust into the folds of the sash. The women also wear brightly colored clothing; but, contrary to most other Muslim women, do not cover their faces with veils.<br />
In northeastern Kurdistan, where the Dimili Kurds live, there are three large river systems: the Arax, the Tigris, and the Euphrates. The valleys surrounding these rivers are rich and fertile--perfect for raising sheep, goats, and cattle. Much of Turkey's meat, grain, and vegetables is also produced there.<br />
Since the government doesn't recognize the Kurds as a distinct people group, they do not invest money or resources into the Kurdish territories. This means, unfortunately, that most of their land has remained undeveloped. The lack of government funds has also hindered the Kurds' educational progress. Most Kurdish villages do not even have a primary school.<br />
The beautiful Caucasus mountain region where the Kurds reside is covered with snow about half of the year.<br />
<b>What are their beliefs?</b><br />
The earliest known religious practices among the Kurds included a Persian form of worship known as "Zoroastrianism." This teaching says that there is indeed an afterlife, and it acknowledges the continuous struggle between good and evil. At the end of the seventh century, however, Arabians conquered this territory, and soon <a href="http://kcm.co.kr/bethany_eng/a_code/islam.html">Muslim </a>teachings replaced Zoroastrianism.<br />
<b>What are their needs?</b><br />
<br />
Events surrounding the Kurds have recently turned the eyes of the world toward Kurdistan. Kurdish hopes for independence, or at least some sort of autonomy, ran high. This has not yet happened, unfortunately, even after the Gulf war; they are still in desperate need. Due to the Turkish government's antagonistic position toward them, the Dimili Kurds do not benefit from government funding or resources. In fact, the Turkish government uses many measures to suppress the identity of the Kurds. For example, the Kurdish language has been banned from use in schools and publications. Illiteracy and unemployment are major problems. Many villages have no water, electricity or telephones, and medical services are inadequate.<br />
Although the Islamic religion is extremely difficult to penetrate, some Turkish Kurds are not devout Muslims and hold Christ in high regard. Unfortunately, however, there are very few believers among the Kurds and there is no Christian outreach being done in their language.<br />
In the literal sense, this group is very difficult to reach simply because hundreds of their villages are inaccessible by road; these may only be reached via small goat trails.<br />
<br />
<b><br />
</b>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3872871571320054609.post-83363395565665975502012-01-22T07:00:00.000-08:002012-01-22T07:01:45.818-08:00THE KURDISH COMMUNITY IN LEBANON<iframe src="http://staff.aub.edu.lb/~lmeho/meho-kawtharani-kurdish-community-in-lebanon.pdf" width="600" height="1025" frameborder="0"></iframe>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3872871571320054609.post-70517786046181851692012-01-11T05:12:00.000-08:002012-01-11T05:18:18.587-08:00Population of Greater Kurdistan and the estimated population of the Kurds<span style="color: red; font-size: large;">Population of Greater Kurdistan and the estimated population of the Kurds</span><br />
The national homeland of the Kurds (Greater Kurdistan) is separated into four regions occupied by Turkey (Northern Kurdistan), Iran (Eastern Kurdistan), Iraq (Southern Kurdistan), and Syria (Western Kurdistan). Northern Kurdistan covers most of the landmass in Southeastern Turkey and stretch to a small coastline of the Mediterranean Sea. Eastern Kurdistan is located in Western Iran covering most of the areas in Northern<br />
Zagros Mountains. Southern Kurdistan is located in Northern Iraq, which is currently an autonomist region called the Kurdistan region of Iraq. Western Kurdistan is located in North Eastern Syria and most of the land area around Efrin district. Each region’s Kurdish population is measured using the national statistic centers of<br />
the nation states that occupy greater Kurdistan. The Kurdish population is one of the hardest data to measure, since they are not recognized by the government of Turkey, Iran,<br />
and Syria as minority groups. It is very difficult to come up with an exact figure for the population of the Kurds in each nation. To measure the population, maps and various sources were used to come up with an estimate for each province that are Kurdish dominated in terms of population and historical records.<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhFGcdaH_ARuL37z8zgCrFinMfn2r6h3MMlNln7XNcauqW7fZHgM3BbQdCk8mOWudVki7CXANKLyxEZFroxt3XmBMGDlFD1EbaDbUn7wtB-wCf6F3o-YlrQhnMnkYGCLY5nAeetMV8bPWI/s1600/contemporarykurdistanmap2005.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="640" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhFGcdaH_ARuL37z8zgCrFinMfn2r6h3MMlNln7XNcauqW7fZHgM3BbQdCk8mOWudVki7CXANKLyxEZFroxt3XmBMGDlFD1EbaDbUn7wtB-wCf6F3o-YlrQhnMnkYGCLY5nAeetMV8bPWI/s640/contemporarykurdistanmap2005.jpg" width="628" /></a></div><br />
Northern Kurdistan has the largest Kurdish population, and it is also the largest region in greater Kurdistan with twenty –five provinces. Eastern Kurdistan has the second largest population and land area with four provinces. Southern Kurdistan is third in terms of population and land area with four provinces. Western Kurdistan is fourth both in population and in land area compared to the other regions of Kurdistan with one province.<br />
<br />
The population of ethnic Kurds is estimated to be around 32,000,000 in greater Kurdistan and in other regions of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. This data does not provide the population of ethnic Kurds in Europe, and North America which is estimated at around 1.4 million. The population data of ethnic Kurds in the Caucasus region which is estimated at around 300,000 to 500,000 is not provided in this paper.<br />
<br />
<br />
<span style="color: red; font-size: large;">Greater Kurdistan Population(2010) Square (KM) Square (miles)</span><br />
<span style="color: blue;">Northern Kurdistan</span><br />
<span style="color: #274e13;">Kurdish names / Turkish names </span><br />
Agiri Agri 539,581 11,498.67 7,144.94<br />
Amed Diyarbakır 1,535,664 15,204.01 9,447.33<br />
Bayazid Igdir 184,494 3,587.81 2,229.36<br />
Bidlîs Bitlis 329,328 7,094.50 4,408.32<br />
Çewlik Bingol 257,273 8,253.51 5,128.49<br />
Colêmerg Hakkari 261,273 7,178.88 4,460.75<br />
Dersim Tunceli 83,299 7,685.66 4,775.65<br />
Dilok Gaziantep 1,687,077 6,844.84 4,253.19<br />
Elih Batman 507,248 4,659.21 2,895.10<br />
Erzingan Erzincan 213,431 11,727.55 7,287.16<br />
Erzorom Erzurum 782,986 25,330.90 14,697.54<br />
İskenderun Hataya 668,960 2,952.45 1,834.57<br />
Kilis Kilis 123,368 1,427,76 887.17<br />
Meleti Malatya 742,211 12,102.70 7,520.27<br />
Merdin Mardin 735,247 8,806.04 5,471.82<br />
Meres Kahramanmaraş 866,041 9,897.41 6,149.97<br />
Mus Mus 404,362 8,067.16 5,012.70<br />
Qares Kars 304,744 10,139.09 6,300.14<br />
Riha Sanliurfa 1,646,524 19,336.21 12,014.96<br />
Semsur Adiyaman 590,300 7,606.16 4,726.25<br />
Şirnex Sirnak 435,986 7,151.57 4,443.78<br />
Sêrt Siirt 296,133 5,473.29 3,400.94<br />
Sêwas Sivas 491,815 18,666.08 11,598.56<br />
Wan Van 1,037,836 18,666.08 12,063.39<br />
Xarput Elazig 553,984 9,281.45 5,767.23<br />
<span style="color: red;">Outside Provinces </span><span style="color: blue;"> </span>5,627,068<br />
<span style="color: blue;">Southern Kurdistan</span><br />
7<br />
Duhok 1,713,461 6,553 4,071.85<br />
Hawler 1,800,769 15,074 9,366.55<br />
Kirkuk 950,000 9,679 6,014.25<br />
Silemani 1,176,709 17,023 10,577.60<br />
<span style="color: blue;">Eastern Kurdistan</span><br />
8<br />
Ilam 544,332 20,133 12,510.07<br />
<br />
Kirmaşan Kermanshah 1,905,793 24,998 15,533.04<br />
Kurdistan 1,467,585 29,137 18,104.89<br />
West Azarbayejan 3,016,301 37,411 23,246.12<br />
Kurds of Khorasan 1,500,000<br />
<span style="color: blue;">Western Kurdistan</span><br />
Western Kurdistan 1,700,000 27,184 16,891.35<br />
<span style="color: red; font-size: large;">Total 36,681,183 434,403.23 270,235.27</span><br />
<i> </i><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>1</i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>Note, the population estimated also includes non-Kurds living in those provinces that are considered part </i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>of greater Kurdistan. The number of Kurds and none Kurds could not be measured due to lack of resource. </i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>2</i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>The land mass for each province were retrieved from http://www.geohive.com/ database.</i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>3</i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>The population estimate for northern Kurdistan provinces were measured using Turkish Statistical </i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>Institute website at http://www.tuik.gov.tr/isgucuapp/isgucu.zul?dil=2</i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>4</i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>In Northern Kurdish most of the province names were changed from their original Kurdish names to </i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>Turkish names by the government of Turkey once the Republic was formed after World War I. The original </i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>Kurdish names were retrieved from various sources.</i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>D.Ebdullah Xefur. 2000. Cografiyay Kurdistan. Hawler. www.mukiryani.com</i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>http://ku.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdistan</i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>http://wapedia.mobi/ku/Bajar%C3%AAn_Kurdistan%C3%AA</i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>5</i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>Only a few districts within the province of Hataya are considered part of greater Kurdistan; therefore, </i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>İskenderun being the main district is used to define the Kurdish province. </i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>6</i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>http://www.timeturk.com/tr/2010/03/25/en-buyuk-kurt-sehri-istanbul.html</i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>7</i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?smap=03010400&lngnr=12&rnr=141&anr=18657</i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>8</i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>Statistical center for Iran, http://amar.sci.org.ir/index_e.aspx</i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>9</i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>http://www.cskk.org/en/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=19</i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>10</i></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #073763;"><i>http://english.rojhelat.eu/perspectives/1007-the-current-situation-of-the-kurds-in-syria</i></span>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3872871571320054609.post-71782961540792086942011-10-07T07:27:00.000-07:002011-10-07T07:27:17.685-07:00Kurdish Family And Households<span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif; line-height: 26px;"></span><br />
<h1 style="color: black; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif; font-size: 1.5em; margin-bottom: 0.25em; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0.25em; text-shadow: rgb(175, 175, 175) 0px 2px 3px;"> Kurdish Family And Households</h1><div><br />
</div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: #e0ddd7; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;">A traditional Kurdish family is a peasant family. A Kurdish household is a patrilineal lineage, assembled around the male head of the family. Such a lineage depends on mutual support and defense while living in the same ancestral village. Although men are responsible for agricultural tasks and socioeconomic and political contacts with the outside world, Kurdish women also contribute to all social, economic, and political processes within their villages. The Kurdish household is a corporate entity whether the extended family lives under the same roof, <i>xani,</i> or breaks into nuclear family sub-units—consisting of mother, father, and their children—in the family compound. During their trans-humance—a seasonal movement organized around the migration of livestock from lowland winter to highland summer pastures—seminomadic pastoralist households may share a tent, live in a compound of tents, or both. The compound is called <i>zoma.</i> The extended Kurdish family includes not only parents and unmarried children, but also married male children, their wives, and their offspring. Unmarried sisters and brothers of the male head of the family may also live with them.<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiT0L-obWll5ZedCyk8oIlVM5YWC5bY1SBqir-r1O5Fi4aiKGKd9Saf7krpH3VI5KxxARicNoPU20_HxpsMx6h7lL2ta7sv4-IF-BfZ2VgKX3Glt2vf2L7-UPGlVtcuVBqox7KpT0f3W0w/s1600/Kurd-Dagh-1905-AO1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="236" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiT0L-obWll5ZedCyk8oIlVM5YWC5bY1SBqir-r1O5Fi4aiKGKd9Saf7krpH3VI5KxxARicNoPU20_HxpsMx6h7lL2ta7sv4-IF-BfZ2VgKX3Glt2vf2L7-UPGlVtcuVBqox7KpT0f3W0w/s400/Kurd-Dagh-1905-AO1.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><br />
According to Kurdish traditions, marriage does not bring with it the creation of a new household. Kurdish traditions oblige the oldest brother and his wife and children to remain with his parents. As family resources expand, married younger brothers build their own houses and move into them, gradually enlarging the family compound. Household production refers to the production of all members of the family compound. The main building, the home for those members of the kin group who share a residence, is referred to as <i>mal.</i> All consumption activities take place in <i>mal.</i> The extended family continues to have meals together in the<i>mal,</i> even after younger sons move to their own houses within it. This is also the case for seminomadic pastoralists. Pastoralist households are united in their village compounds during some seasons and may be cyclically divided between pasture camps when they move to higher plateaus during the summer months.<br />
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjpUJZ1gq1Mg3OJX4X9Fp5B6P_BNPNnm2MpAHXjUQYu2t44-PWfUwrotw6agOwqd-qO0qm3U_1Ob8ff6rmbfUWwZQoaxurmIEmuKIKPJTa7S2U2ooOlu98jsWZQCjWmtVm8gDGwttvH_NI/s1600/nn0011.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="212" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjpUJZ1gq1Mg3OJX4X9Fp5B6P_BNPNnm2MpAHXjUQYu2t44-PWfUwrotw6agOwqd-qO0qm3U_1Ob8ff6rmbfUWwZQoaxurmIEmuKIKPJTa7S2U2ooOlu98jsWZQCjWmtVm8gDGwttvH_NI/s320/nn0011.JPG" width="320" /></a></div><br />
</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: #e0ddd7; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;">A Kurdish household is a unit where production, reproduction, distribution, and consumption take place. <i>Mal</i> is an economic unit for about thirty million Kurds in the Middle East. <i>Mal</i> is also very important for urban families in transition and for diaspora families. Not only the first, but often the transitional second generation of migrant families in urban areas replicate this pattern. However, with the creation of permanent wage labor, young modernized urban families both challenge and reiterate traditional arrangements. They may independently decide not to pool their income with their extended families, while insisting on their traditional rights to resources, such as their share from the harvest and animals.<span><br />
</span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: #e0ddd7; font-family: Georgia, 'Times New Roman', Times, serif;">For hundreds of years, Kurdish households have relied on a broad range of economic activities to generate income. Within households in Kurdistan, noncapitalist forms of labor exchanges (reciprocal labor exchanges) transform all daily activities—agricultural work, animal husbandry, daily chores, and preparations for weddings and other celebrations. Intrahousehold exchanges expand to encompass interhousehold exchanges with kin who are living in the same villages and hamlets. A traditional form of reciprocal labor exchange, called <i>zebari</i> or <i>zebare,</i> is recognized as an obligation to be fulfilled between kin and neighbors, even in urban contexts. Another form of labor exchange, also called <i>zebari,</i> is a form of forced labor. Tribal Kurds are obliged to work for their tribal leaders and landlords. While fulfilling <i>zebari</i> obligations, men work in agriculture for a limited time, but the duration of women's work in the houses of their tribal leaders or landlords is never specifically defined.<br />
Historically, most peasant Kurdish households occupy multiple class positions as merchants and petty producers, and according to their participation in capitalist relations as wage laborers. From the 1950s onward, the development of wage relations was tied to the monetization of the rural economy and was closely correlated with a house-hold's access to land. Today, the families of seasonal workers continue to live in rural areas while their men return home for cultivation and harvest. Permanent wage employment is particularly important for urban Kurdish families. The jobs available for unskilled urban Kurds are in the construction industry and the service sector is attracting a growing number of Kurdish women as well as men. Successful urbanized families responding to socioeconomic changes are gaining a greater ability to live independently from rural, social, and economic networks and are distancing themselves from rural obligations.<br />
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgGWJRfbjC2TamBbUPjrsMeXDeBq2O-ugmyRMVa8NCjYUBmE6Akq6BABQMzMAZRbOxt-btneeuty7i8lsBTFlyRFbVU21QQ-FqFITCOcADFMLRRs3Hz1oxAYdnsabFXtMNS_vckdfPDJQE/s1600/Yezidis-holiest-object.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="227" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgGWJRfbjC2TamBbUPjrsMeXDeBq2O-ugmyRMVa8NCjYUBmE6Akq6BABQMzMAZRbOxt-btneeuty7i8lsBTFlyRFbVU21QQ-FqFITCOcADFMLRRs3Hz1oxAYdnsabFXtMNS_vckdfPDJQE/s320/Yezidis-holiest-object.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br />
For almost all Kurds—Sunni (Shafiis), Shii (Twelvers), Alevi (<i>Ahl-el</i> Haqqs), and Yezidi (a heterodox sect occurring only among Kirmanchispeaking Kurds)—household relations define gender relations. Kurdish households have both a male, <i>malxî,</i> and female head, <i>kabanî,</i> with clearly defined duties concerning production, distribution, and consumption allocations. There are gender and intergenerational inequalities in patriarchal Kurdish households. In rural households, with the exception of female heads of households, women have a subordinate role in household decisionmaking. However, they are able to exercise power by negotiating with patriarchal structures, especially by choosing to socially isolate themselves from family affairs, thereby publicly damaging the reputation of the family. The women of seminomadic pastoral tribes enjoy privileges that allow them to be nominal equals with their husbands. Peasant women's engagement in wage labor in urban settings weakens the old patriarchal traditions and allows women to have decision-making power in their households.<br />
<span><br />
</span></span>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3872871571320054609.post-73184081436997330342011-10-06T11:46:00.000-07:002011-10-06T11:46:14.798-07:00THE KURDS OF IRAQ: RECENT HISTORY, FUTURE PROSPECTS<span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: ivory;"><b></b></span><br />
<h2 align="CENTER"><b>THE KURDS OF IRAQ: RECENT HISTORY, FUTURE PROSPECTS</b></h2><div align="center" class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: small;">By Carole A. O’Leary</span></div><div align="JUSTIFY"><i>This article briefly recounts the developing situation of Iraqi Kurds over the last decade and discusses what the future of this group might be like in a post-Saddam Iraq. It explores the option of a federal system in which a division of powers between the central government and north would provide a way for effective regional government will ensuring the state's unity. A workable, acceptable solution to the Kurdish problem would be absolutely necessary for the future stability of Iraq. The article also looks at how the decade-long experience of Kurdish self-rule in a democratic framework affects the debate over Iraq's future. The article concludes with a chronology of modern Kurdish history.</i></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh0hMtX5XywHvDTpqxV9JiDu8IELJMlGxnJjCcef2mcwhSk_idW9vwqrcwVerB033_3K8x-CeWfw1e2UXH764c8O_mCtPlsuy1JCfFi249USR_mRfEdlLOw4-XgQdDQV3lN9JfiCiWTJ68/s1600/11.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="228" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh0hMtX5XywHvDTpqxV9JiDu8IELJMlGxnJjCcef2mcwhSk_idW9vwqrcwVerB033_3K8x-CeWfw1e2UXH764c8O_mCtPlsuy1JCfFi249USR_mRfEdlLOw4-XgQdDQV3lN9JfiCiWTJ68/s320/11.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><div align="JUSTIFY"><i><br />
</i></div><div align="JUSTIFY">The Kurds, an Iranian ethno-linguistic group--like Persians, Lurs, Baluch and Bakhtiari,--inhabit the mostly mountainous area where the borders of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria converge. Following World War I and the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds were promised their own country under the terms of the 1920 Treaty of Sevres only to find the offer rescinded under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Numbering at least 25 million people, Kurds are mostly divided among Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. The main area they inhabit is about 230,000 square miles, equal to German and Britain combined. The Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the world without a state. The term "Kurdistan" is widely used in Iraq to refer to the Kurdish area of northern Iraq and in Iran to refer to the Kurdish area of northwest Iran. Turkey and Syria, however, avoid this term for political reasons, although under the Ottomans it was widely used.</div><div align="JUSTIFY">The area of northern Iraq where Kurds predominate, is a region of about 83,000 square kilometers. This is roughly the same size as Austria. Smaller ethno-linguistic communities of Assyrian-Chaldeans, Turkomans, Arabs, and Armenians are also found in Iraqi Kurdistan. In Iraq there are approximately 3.7 million Kurds in the predominantly Kurdish northern safe haven area, and between 1 and 2 million in the rest of Iraq, particularly Baghdad, Mosul and that part of Iraqi Kurdistan still under the control of the Baghdad regime.(1)</div><div align="JUSTIFY">The majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims. There are also Shi’a and Yezidi Kurds, as well as Christians who identify themselves as Kurds. Yezidis are Kurds who follow a religion that combines indigenous pre-Islamic and Islamic traditions. The once thriving Jewish Kurdish community in Iraq now consists of a few families in the Kurdish safe haven.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi6rpxjdFRQdi2nQD7YU6ccQQKcJp1p3ZmG-ieDr_zlnaBN2KX1NzPz7kyp741uoQXzqk1vbMAJ_tbkbUps0Fx_f44UMHY6y11nRGA2qSUGcygQtEFPwOs-dnaxsixu-WmL9jlC0JHd1J4/s1600/flg.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi6rpxjdFRQdi2nQD7YU6ccQQKcJp1p3ZmG-ieDr_zlnaBN2KX1NzPz7kyp741uoQXzqk1vbMAJ_tbkbUps0Fx_f44UMHY6y11nRGA2qSUGcygQtEFPwOs-dnaxsixu-WmL9jlC0JHd1J4/s320/flg.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><div align="JUSTIFY"><br />
</div><div align="JUSTIFY">Since the creation of the modern state of Iraq, the history of Iraqi Kurdistan has been one of underdevelopment, political and cultural repression, destruction, ethnic cleansing and genocide.(2) Al-Anfal (The Spoils) was the codename given to an aggressive, planned, military operation against Iraqi Kurds. It was part of an ongoing, larger campaign against Kurds because of their struggle to gain autonomy within the Republic of Iraq. Anfal took place during 1988 under the direction of Ali Hasan al-Majid, Saddam Hussein's cousin. He became known as "Chemical Ali" because of his use of chemical and biological weapons on Kurdish towns and villages.</div><div align="JUSTIFY">The broad purpose of the campaign was to eliminate resistance by the Kurds by any means necessary. Its specific aim was to cleanse the region of "saboteurs"--who included all males between the ages of 15 and 70. Mass executions were carried out in the targeted villages and surrounding areas. The operation was carefully planned and included identifying villages in rebel held areas, declaring these villages and surrounding areas "prohibited" and authorizing the killing of any person or animal found in these areas.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgfNZFfY1FSSfrmdxPkR4J-iyo65BOwFD4ZJ6kuucXDAV1v5Eigr4QWK0Qp3pZ2tUcT4CRmIJJKwQkIyGkEWqMIZs63Z5ktN8xl3QYXLvjNGuaLpbUjvGI0oPpDl3S1UOkFyc8myMHZf3Q/s1600/anfal.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="231" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgfNZFfY1FSSfrmdxPkR4J-iyo65BOwFD4ZJ6kuucXDAV1v5Eigr4QWK0Qp3pZ2tUcT4CRmIJJKwQkIyGkEWqMIZs63Z5ktN8xl3QYXLvjNGuaLpbUjvGI0oPpDl3S1UOkFyc8myMHZf3Q/s320/anfal.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><div align="JUSTIFY"><br />
</div><div align="JUSTIFY">Economic blockades were put onto these villages to cut them off from all support. The army also planned for the evacuation of them and the inhabitants' relocation to reservation-like collective towns. People who refused to leave were often shot. In some cases, people who agreed to leave were gathered up and separated, with men from 15 to 70 in one group; women, children, and elderly men in another. Many of the men were executed while the others were removed to the collective towns or to camps in the south of Iraq.</div><div align="JUSTIFY">During the Anfal operation, some 1,200 villages were destroyed. More than 180,000 persons are missing and presumed dead. While the Iraqi government was motivated partly by the fact that some Kurdish groups cooperated with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, documentation recovered in the Kurdish safe haven in 1991 reveals that this operation was part of a larger campaign undertaken by Saddam throughout his time in power. Many now regard this operation as proof of genocide against Iraqi Kurds. In all phases of the ethnic cleansing program, which began when the Baath Party first seized power in 1963 and culminated in the Anfal operation, it is estimated that more than 4,000 villages in rural Kurdistan were destroyed and perhaps 300,000 people perished.</div><div align="JUSTIFY"><br />
</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEitFPxjMA5tUTi9YEV2hj6tmWpa0AmLcCkhoXveQQ6BtSL_c8TwZOQPip4rmQPf3cb4aVylhAC8F0Isjd6K08uikZCcDlxY260tL4LikpgEyj-EoS6T3Qf4rD3LAfSdkJZXFHtjkZXj1XI/s1600/zivistan1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="208" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEitFPxjMA5tUTi9YEV2hj6tmWpa0AmLcCkhoXveQQ6BtSL_c8TwZOQPip4rmQPf3cb4aVylhAC8F0Isjd6K08uikZCcDlxY260tL4LikpgEyj-EoS6T3Qf4rD3LAfSdkJZXFHtjkZXj1XI/s320/zivistan1.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><div align="JUSTIFY"><br />
</div><div align="JUSTIFY">The best-known chemical attack occurred at Halabja in March 1988. This town is located in the mountains near Sulaimaniya, about 11 kilometers from the Iranian border. Between 40,000 and 50,000 people were living there at the time. The Iranian army had previously pushed Iraqi forces out of the area. During three days, the town and surrounding district were attacked with conventional bombs, artillery fire, and chemicals--including mustard gas and nerve agents (Sarin, Tabun, and VX). At least 5,000 people died immediately as a result of the chemical attack and it is estimated that up to 12,000 people died during those three days.</div>Almost fifteen years later, there is still not much known about the impact of these agents on the people and environment. Dr. Christine Gosden, a professor of Medical Genetics at the University of Liverpool, working with the Washington Kurdish Institute (WKI), helped establish the Halabja Post-Graduate Medical Institute to understand the impact of weapons of mass destruction on civilian populations. It offers both research and medical help for thousands of survivors living in the area.(3) The Kurds' first-hand experience with such attacks has prompted their request to the international community for protection from this type of weapons in the event of U.S.-led military action against Iraq.<br />
In April 1991, following the March uprising of Kurds in the north and Shi’a Arabs in the south against the central government, Iraqi Kurdistan was divided into two parts. Relying on UN Security Council Resolution 688, military forces from eleven countries, including the United States and Turkey, implemented Operation Provide Comfort to give security and humanitarian assistance to refugees in camps along the Iraq-Turkey border. The so-called Kurdish safe haven and northern no-fly zone were established in this context. Under considerable constraint and against strong external and internal opposition, the Kurdish safe haven has been successfully governed for a decade by the Kurds themselves. This part of Iraqi Kurdistan is roughly 40,000 square kilometers, or about half of Iraqi Kurdistan.(4) The rest continues to be directly governed by Baghdad.<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgr_abMkQz3GFZl3Gl0vm9CBBSdlhToMCr1WWdI8p1qY7-WSr0TlgSRJz_9Wao1alnM65IjlPwxOKz5UobI6aF_OSrauBaq2g8welKznHhqG9mXAMS4G6glWFw5xD4yMRNYx6AUg6KqyOA/s1600/KRG_Logo.gif" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="306" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgr_abMkQz3GFZl3Gl0vm9CBBSdlhToMCr1WWdI8p1qY7-WSr0TlgSRJz_9Wao1alnM65IjlPwxOKz5UobI6aF_OSrauBaq2g8welKznHhqG9mXAMS4G6glWFw5xD4yMRNYx6AUg6KqyOA/s320/KRG_Logo.gif" width="320" /></a></div><br />
In October 1991, the Government of Iraq (GOI) voluntarily withdrew its civil administration and the citizens of the Kurdish safe haven were left to govern themselves. Elections were held in May 1992 and the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) were created. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) entered into an equal power-sharing arrangement, with 5 of the 105 KNA seats allocated to members of the Assyrian-Chaldean Christian community. Turkomans boycotted the election, although efforts were made to include representatives from all ethnic and religious communities.<br />
Participatory processes were instituted to develop experience with the requirements, and systems and procedures of democracy. These elections were deemed to have been free and fair by international observers.(5) Regional governance has been based on the March 1970 Autonomy Agreement with the GOI. Four provinces were established, each headed by a governor.<br />
The regional government, headed by a prime minister with a cabinet of ministers, was established in the regional capital of Erbil. But the 50-50 power-sharing arrangement broke down within two years. Today, the Kurdish safe haven is governed in two separate parts, each by one of the two main parties (KDP and PUK). Efforts have been on-going to find how to integrate the two administrations.<br />
Despite this disappointment, there have been some more positive developments. Free and fair local elections, under international observation, were conducted in dozens of municipalities in 2000 and 2001 in the KDP and PUK areas. For the first time since 1994, the KNA convened in its entirety in Erbil on October 4, 2002. The reconvening of the KNA is a clear indication of the growing cooperation between the KDP and PUK, particularly in their dealings with the Bush administration and U.S. Congress, as well as with states in the region and Europe. In particular, the KDP and PUK are unified in asserting the Kurdish right to self-determination in a future democratic Iraq in which they call for Iraqi Kurdistan entering into a federal relationship with the central government under a new constitutional arrangement.<br />
The Kurdish safe haven is now a decade-old example of what can happen throughout the rest of Iraq. The liberated part of Iraqi Kurdistan has become a refuge for all Iraqis seeking freedom and democracy. Since 1991, thousands of Iraqi refugees in Iran have returned. And since 1991, thousands more Iraqis from central or southern Iraq have sought asylum. Even more striking, some families who fled Iraq over 20 years ago, and who became citizens of the United States and European countries, elected to return since 1991.<br />
Despite various internal difficulties and constraints, including the strong opposition of neighboring countries and both external and internal embargoes on the region by the Iraqi government, all basic public services have been provided to the extent resources have permitted. Freedom of speech and of free movement is respected. Local NGOs have been established and the three universities are working with U.S. and European partners to develop new academic programs, reform and update curricula, and provide faculty training opportunities. The region's leadership has allowed satellite television with over 500 channels to be available to anyone who can purchase readily available hardware. Private companies provide uncensored international phone service. Unlimited and uncensored Internet access is also available from private, independent sources. According to Human Rights Watch, the leadership of the region has made notable progress in promoting and protecting the basic rights of the people of liberated Iraqi Kurdistan.(6)<br />
With assistance from the international community, hundreds of destroyed communities were reconstructed and tens of thousands of families were able to return to their original homes between 1991 and 1997. Despite serious problems due to inefficiency, intransigence and the efforts of Baghdad, the oil-for-food (SCR-986) program that began functioning in 1997 continues to provide the region with substantial resources from Iraq's public oil wealth for health care, reconstruction and education. The KRG directly cooperates with twelve UN agencies in the region, including nine involved in the management of the oil-for-food program.<br />
The history of Iraqi Kurdistan before 1991 is the history of destruction and displacement. More than 4,000 communities were destroyed including towns of more than 50,000 Iraqi citizens. Hundreds of thousands of citizens were detained and killed. Tens of thousands were forced to live in Baghdad-controlled "collective towns." Many were injured in years of warfare. Despite their achievements in democratization and civil society building since 1991, the citizens of Iraqi Kurdistan continue to be threatened by Baghdad and the neighboring states in a manner that jeopardizes their hard-won freedom and tenuous well-being. The future of Iraqi Kurdistan remains most uncertain.<br />
<u><div align="JUSTIFY"><br />
</div></u><div align="JUSTIFY"><b>POST-SADDAM IRAQ AND FEDERAL ARRANGEMENTS</b></div><div align="JUSTIFY">One extremely important consequence of the Kurdish safe haven’s existence is that some 3.7 million Iraqis—a considerable portion of the country’s population—have actual experience with self-rule, civil rights, and a transition to democracy.(7) How would this situation interact with the rest of the Iraq if it were to be freed from the current regime?</div><div align="JUSTIFY">Certainly, those in the safe haven are greatly concerned about the effects of war and regime change in Iraq, in terms of the threat posed by the war, a possibly unstable aftermath, and their future status in a new Iraq. There is strong support in the U.S. government, Iraqi opposition movements—ranging from the Iraq National Congress (INC) through the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and Kurdish groups—for a federalist structure in the country.(8)</div><div align="JUSTIFY">Iraqis in exile and those lucky enough to live inside the Kurdish safe haven are currently debating the framework for a federal state. Some advocate a federal system consisting of two political units: the Arab region and Kurdistan. Others have suggested dividing Iraq into three federal units: Kurdistan, a Sunni Arab center and a Shi’a Arab south. An arrangement of five federal units (Kurdistan, Baghdad, Jazirah, Kufa and Basra) has also been suggested.(9) Iraq’s Kurds would support the division of Iraq into any number of federal units, under a federal system, as long as Iraqi Kurdistan itself constitutes one of those federal units.</div><div align="JUSTIFY">At a recent conference hosted by the University of Southern Denmark, Brendan O’Leary outlined an interesting alternative to the adoption of a federal political system for all of Iraq.(10) In his view, Iraqi Kurdistan could enter into an institutionalized federal arrangement with the central government wherein the rest of Iraq is not federally organized. He refers to this arrangement as federacy. In theory, this model could accommodate the Arab majority in Iraq if system-wide federalism is voted down in a referendum. It is possible, indeed likely, that the Kurds would have no objection to the creation of a democratic Iraq that is not federally organized, as long as Iraqi Kurdistan itself achieves self-rule in a constitutionally mandated federal arrangement with the center.</div><div align="JUSTIFY">There is, however, a subtle but important distinction in how the federalist concept might be applied. The Kurds have tended to favor an explicitly Kurdish self-governing portion of Iraq. Another option would be a northern self-governing section (or several such divisions) which are organized on a regional but not ethnic basis. Most Kurds seem to favor the former approach, while most American officials favor the latter approach as a way to reduce ethnic tension in a post-Saddam Iraq. Further, Kurds explicitly have opposed the division of historic Iraqi Kurdistan into multiple federal units, an idea which has currency among some American analysts.(11)</div><div align="JUSTIFY">Under what might be called a "Kurdistani" rather than "Kurdish" political solution, a Kurdish majority would still control a geographically defined northern state within an Iraqi federalist system. Still, that type of structure would reduce Turkish objections while also preserving the rights of non-Kurdish minorities, especially Turkomans, in the area, who would be less enthusiastic about a Kurdish ethnic entity. But would the Kurds find such a plan acceptable? The issue is not just whether the Kurds will exercise a right to self-determination but how they will choose to do so. My field work in the area (see below) shows some important trends relative to this issue.</div><div align="JUSTIFY">Federalism refers to a system of government in which power is divided between a central authority and constituent political units which have a fair degree of local power, including the ability to raise taxes and a militia, for example. In some multi-cultural states like Switzerland, the constituent political units are defined not only geographically but also culturally on the basis of language, ethnicity, religion or tribe. Federalism as an organizing structure for governance can promote stability in multi-ethnic or multi-religious states through the establishment of political units whose relationship to the center is defined in a constitution that provides written principles concerning structures and rules for governance and appropriation of federal funds.</div><div align="JUSTIFY">As in the United States, federalism in a future Iraq can provide a system of checks and balances to moderate the power of any future central government, inhibiting the ability of an autocratic leadership–secularist or Islamist–to seize control of the center. And, as in Switzerland, federalism can guarantee the political and cultural rights of Iraq’s ethno-linguistic and religious communities.</div><div align="JUSTIFY">The creation of a constitutionally mandated federal relationship between Iraqi Kurdistan and a post-Saddam Hussein central government is the only solution that will address the legitimate right to self-determination of Iraq’s Kurdish community in the context of a unified Iraqi state. Absent a just and lasting resolution to the Kurdish question in Iraq, it will prove impossible to achieve stability in a post-Saddam Hussein state.(12) Equally, an unstable post-Saddam Hussein Iraq would be unlikely to pursue democratization – a stated goal of the Bush administration.</div><div align="JUSTIFY">In theory, the establishment of a federal system of governance that includes power-sharing at the center and self-governance for Iraqi Kurdistan is a model that will work well in Iraq. In practice, the challenge is to achieve internal, regional and international support for the self-determination of Iraq’s Kurdish community in a federal and democratic Iraq.</div><div align="JUSTIFY"><br />
</div><div align="JUSTIFY"><b>THE ROLE OF TURKEY</b></div><div align="JUSTIFY">A key concern for the Kurds, as well as the Bush Administration, is Turkey's evolving position on federalism and the Kurdish question in Iraq.(13) Turkey has consistently opposed the creation of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq Kurdistan. However, Turkey has also raised concerns about the establishment of a federal arrangement between Iraqi Kurdistan and a post-Saddam Hussein central government. Turkey’s primary concern is that Mosul and the oil-rich city of Kirkuk are not ceded to a new Kurdistan federal unit.</div><div align="JUSTIFY">In the period since the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government, the disposition of the Iraqi Turkoman community has also been of concern to Turkey. In this regard, Turkey and its proxy inside the Kurdish safe haven– the Iraqi Turkoman Front--have called for the establishment of a Turkoman federal unit to include the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk if a permanent Kurdistan federal region is created. Turkish leaders have declared that the future establishment of a Kurdistan federal region to include Kirkuk is a casus belli. In fact, the Turks appear to have positioned themselves to intervene militarily in Iraqi Kurdistan in the event of a regime change.(14)</div><div align="JUSTIFY">Estimates of the number Turkoman in Iraq are unreliable and politicized. They range between 350,000 to well over one million. Similarly, the exact number of Kurds and Turkoman living in Kirkuk today is unknown.(15) Historically the city was predominately Kurdish, but successive Iraqi governments have pursued a policy of ethnic cleansing in Kirkuk, directed first against the Kurds and later against the Turkoman as well.(16)</div><div align="JUSTIFY">The proposed constitution for a Kurdistan political unit in a federal Iraq, drafted by the KDP and PUK and currently under review by the recently reunified Kurdistan National Assembly does call for the inclusion of Kirkuk in a future Kurdistan federal political unit. However, the draft constitution is clear in ceding control of Kirkuk’s oil to the new central government and in recognizing the fact that Kirkuk is a multi-ethnic city inhabited by Kurds, Arabs, Turkomans and Assyrians. The draft constitution calls for regularly scheduled mayoral elections in which members of all ethnic and religious communities can field eligible candidates.(17)</div><div align="JUSTIFY">Iraq’s Kurds are concerned that Turkey’s strategic relationship with the United States will negatively influence U.S. support for the kind of federal arrangement they want to see. The Kurds have repeatedly and publicly assured the U.S. and Turkey that they do not seek independence but prefer a unified, federal and democratic Iraq within which Kurdistan represents one of the federal political units. They have repeatedly indicated that they will work with a representative transitional government to create a constitution for a federal Iraq that addresses the needs of all the communities in Iraq.</div><div align="JUSTIFY">Whether Kirkuk is incorporated into a Kurdistan federal region in a future Iraq and whether a separate federal region for the Turkomans will be established cannot be unilaterally determined by Turkey. Clearly, these are issues for the Iraqi people to decide. Iraqi Kurds who have been expelled from Kirkuk and its environs will surely return after the liberation of Iraq. If the majority of Kirkukis were to vote in favor of annexing Kirkuk to the Kurdistan federal political unit in a future referendum in a democratic Iraq, this would be a powerful argument for doing so.</div><div align="JUSTIFY">In thinking about a federal solution for Iraq, it is important to note that Turkey is supporting a UN plan to create a Swiss-style federal government in Cyprus in which the Republic of Cyprus would be replaced by two component states–one Turkish and one Greek–each with its own constitution, in addition to a common state with a presidential council and a two-chamber legislature. Even the Tamil Tigers seem to have reached the conclusion that a federal arrangement with the government of Sri Lanka will address their demands for self-determination through "substantial regional autonomy."(18)</div><div align="JUSTIFY">A key question for American and European policy makers–as well as for Iraqis and Turkey– is whether federalism is the only viable solution to Iraq’s still unresolved Kurdish question that will ensure the territorial integrity of the state. A second question is how the federalism will be structured. And a third is whether federalism, as an organizing structure for governance in pluralistic societies, can best ensure stability in Iraq after regime change--a necessary condition for the development of democracy, human rights and an active civil society.</div><div align="JUSTIFY"><br />
</div><div align="JUSTIFY"><b>IDENTITY FORMATION IN IRAQI KURDISTAN SINCE 1991</b></div><div align="JUSTIFY">When I returned from a visit to the region in June 2001, I wrote that an unintended but welcome consequence of the establishment of the Kurdish Safe haven in 1991 was an ongoing experiment in democracy.(19) Based on subsequent fieldwork conducted in July 2002, I would further suggest that a second unintended but welcome consequence of the establishment of the safe haven is an experiment in pluralism that is encouraging the emergence of a communal identity shared by Kurds, Assyrian-Chaldeans and Turkomans.</div><div align="JUSTIFY">I have termed this emerging form of collective identity "Kurdistani-ness" for lack of a better word. My interviews with Assyrian-Chaldean and Turkoman intellectuals, political and religious leaders, and cultural activists suggest that the decade long experiment in self rule has been a golden age not only for the Kurds but for these smaller communities as well. In trying to contextualize the frequent use of the term "Kurdistani" by my Kurdish, Assyrian-Chaldean and Turkoman informants, I was reminded of how Americans use the descriptors "New England" and "New Englanders" to define not only geographic but also cultural and historic aspects of this localized American identity.</div><div align="JUSTIFY">My discussions with more than 100 Kurds, Assyrian-Chaldeans and Turkomans suggest that this new sense of Kurdistani identity is taking root precisely because it accommodates pluralism or cultural diversity by not threatening deeply rooted ethno-linguistic identities. The Kurdish Democratic Party--established in 1946 and renamed the Kurdistan Democratic Party in 1953--supported a broad-based political platform for all Kurdistanis regardless of ethnic identity. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Party has advocated the same view since its creation in 1975.</div><div align="JUSTIFY">However; it is only in the post-1991 period that the people of Iraqi Kurdistan have experienced self rule and democratization. This emerging Kurdistani identity allows Kurds, Assyro-Chaldeans and Turkoman to maintain their respective ethno-linguistic identities and, at the same time, to establish a wider sense of collective identity based on three key factors:</div><div align="JUSTIFY">--Common geography;</div><div align="JUSTIFY">--The ongoing experiment in self rule, democratization and cultural tolerance;</div><div align="JUSTIFY">--And their shared experience as non-Arab Iraqis who have all known repression and marginalization within the modern state of Iraq.(20)</div><div align="JUSTIFY">Suham Wali, one of the many Turkomans I interviewed, is an educator and cultural activist, as well as director-general of Turkoman Studies in the Ministry of Education in Erbil. She argues that the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government in 1992 was a milestone. For the first time in Iraq's modern history, the cultural and political rights of all communities were truly guaranteed. According to Wali, while the Kurdish majority may have first sought to address the rights of their own community, the new political structure under the KRG has benefited all communities. She describes political life in safe haven since 1991 as "a work in progress in which all communities, not just the Kurdish majority, participate." Based on my interviews with Turkomans and Assyrian-Chaldeans, I would suggest that it is this growing confidence in the Kurdistan Regional Government’s protection of the political and cultural rights of all communities–not just the Kurdish majority–that has caused these two communities to embrace a shared Kurdistani cultural identity, in addition to their respective ethno-linguistic identities.(21)</div><div align="JUSTIFY">Moreover, I would suggest that this shared sense of Kurdistani-ness relates to a developing sense of communal solidarity as these communities ponder their fate in a post-Saddam Iraq. For these reasons, I would argue that the growing sense of Kurdistani-ness among Kurds, Assyrian-Chaldeans and Turkomans in the Kurdish safe haven has implications for the debate on federalism as the best model for governance in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.</div><div align="JUSTIFY">It is well know that the Kurds support a concept of federalism in which all of Iraqi Kurdistan forms one of the new federal political units. What is less well understood is level of support for this position among Assyrian-Chaldeans and Turkoman in the northern safe haven. Future research can focus on how this emerging sense of Kurdistani identity will affect support for federalism within the Assyrian-Chaldean and Turkoman communities in the safe haven.</div><div align="JUSTIFY"><br />
</div><div align="JUSTIFY"><b>CONCLUSIONS</b></div><div align="JUSTIFY">As political realists, Iraq’s Kurds do not seek separation from Iraq. Their goal is to share in the establishment of a viable regional government for Iraqi Kurdistan in a unified Iraq under a federal system, with a governing document that provides written principles concerning structures and rules for governance and appropriation of federal funds. Federal systems flourish around the globe and the establishment of such a structure in Iraq should not be viewed as a threat by Turkey, Iran or the Arab states of the region. On the contrary, federalism can help to ensure the unity and stability of a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, thereby providing a climate for democratization and civil society building. Such an outcome is clearly in the interest of the United States and its European allies, as well as in the interest of Turkey and the Iraqi people.</div><div align="JUSTIFY">Given the fact that the Iraqi regime has pursued a genocidal campaign of ethnic cleansing against its Kurdish community, it is imperative that any future structure of governance institutionalize protections and guarantees for all of Iraq’s communities, but most notably for the Kurds who have been so brutally victimized on the basis of cultural identity. A unified, democratic and federally organized Iraq would not only address the legitimate right to self-determination of the Kurdish community but also guarantee the rights of all communities within Iraq.</div><div align="JUSTIFY"><br />
</div><b>CHRONOLOGY</b><br />
The following is a selected chronology of some of the significant events that had an impact on Iraq’s Kurds in the past century.<br />
1918 President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points: Woodrow Wilson was committed to the ideal of self-determination for all peoples. The Twelfth Point stated that non-Turkish nationalities living under Ottoman control "should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development."<br />
1920 The Treaty of Sevres: At the end of World War I, the Allied powers met to determine the political future of lands and peoples in the defeated Ottoman Empire. The Treaty provided for independence from Turkey in those parts of Anatolia where Kurds were in the majority and set forth a political mechanism for the establishment of a Kurdish state that was to have encompassed the vilayet of Mosul. The Treaty of Sevres was signed but never ratified.<br />
1923 The Treaty of Lausanne: The Treaty of Lausanne superseded the Treaty of Sevres. The Kurds were not given autonomy and the areas where they lived were distributed between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the Soviet Union. The greatest number of Kurds found themselves either under the control of the Turkish state or under British rule in the newly created state of Iraq. A League of Nations delegation to Mosul in 1923 to determine the wishes of the Kurds there reported they wanted an independent state.<br />
1924 British view: The British High Commission issued a statement on December 24, 1924, "Recognizing the right of the Kurds living within the frontiers of Iraq to establish a Kurdish government inside these frontiers."<br />
1932 Iraqi Independence: In 1932, Iraq was granted full independence by the British and the Kurdish problem was left unresolved.<br />
1946 Republic of Mahabad: In Iran, Kurds established the short-lived Republic of Mahabad, which survived from January 1946 until December 1946.<br />
1946 Creation of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq: This party changed its name to the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq in 1953 to emphasize the inclusion of the non-Kurdish communities of Iraqi Kurdistan.<br />
1958 Iraq under Abd al Karim Qasim: After the monarchy was overthrown, Qasim encouraged the participation of Kurds in the new government until his power was consolidated. In 1959, the new government began to clamp down on all dissident groups including the Kurds. In 1961, a Kurdish rebellion broke out which continued intermittently for the next fourteen years.<br />
1963 Phase I of the Ethnic Cleansing and Arabization Campaign: The ethnic cleansing and Arabization campaign began when the Ba’th party first came to power in 1963 and lasted until the temporary removal of the Ba'th leadership in February 1964. During this time, the Iraqi regime began destroying most of the Shorgha, Azadi, and Akhur Hussein neighborhoods inside the city of Kirkuk. Hundreds of houses were flattened using bulldozers. The inhabitants of some forty villages in the Kirkuk governorate were forcibly evicted and Arabs from the south and center of Iraq resettled there.<br />
1970 Autonomy Agreement between Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Government of Iraq: On March 11, 1970, an autonomy agreement was worked out between the KDP and the central government which acknowledged the existence of Kurds and granted certain rights, but included only three of five Kurdish provinces. It excluded provinces like Kirkuk which contain oil.<br />
1974 Kurdish Revolt against the Iraqi Government: By 1974, relations between the Kurds and the central government had deteriorated to the point of armed rebellion. During this period, Iran and Iraq were involved in extensive border disputes. The United States was backing Iran and Iran was backing the Iraqi Kurds in their struggle in order to put pressure on Iraq. In 1975, the border disputes were settled under the Algiers Accord and the United States and Iran withdrew their support of the Iraqi Kurds. As a result, the rebellion collapsed. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds fled the country to refugee camps, mainly in Iran. Many who could not escape were murdered.<br />
1974 Phase II of the Ethnic Cleansing and Arabization Campaign: After the collapse of negotiations between the Kurds and the Iraqi regime in 1974, the Ba'th government implemented the ethnic cleansing and Arabization policy begun in 1963 to reduce the predominantly Kurdish population in areas deemed of strategic economic or political importance to Iraq. In particular, the areas surrounding Kirkuk where large oil fields are located and those within a 20-kilometer strip near the Iran-Turkey border were targeted. Kurds were forcibly deported, murdered, removed to refugee camps, or resettled in collective towns. Kurdish language instruction was terminated in schools. Villages and wells in border areas were destroyed. This area became a kind of no-man-land and anyone found entering this 20-km. strip was imprisoned and executed. Many Faily (Shi’a) Kurds living in Baghdad were deported to Iran as well.<br />
1975 Creation of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK): It was established in June 1975 in Damascus, Syria, after the collapse of the Kurdish rebellion that same year.<br />
1980 The Iran-Iraq War: While many Kurds fought against the Iranians during this war, others continued the rebellion against the central government, often with Iranian support. This diverted Iraqi troops from the battlefront to the Kurdish areas. By 1987, the Kurds, with the support of Iran, controlled most of Iraqi Kurdistan. Saddam appointed his cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid in charge of northern Iraq with full authority and powers to eliminate the Kurdish rebellion. Chemical attacks, further destruction of villages, pollution of water supplies, detentions, and mass murders were some of the methods used to put down the rebellion.<br />
1984 Phase III of the Arabization Campaign: After another failed attempt at negotiation in 1984, the regime began systematic destruction of villages, homes, churches and mosques in the Kurdish areas. Its operation reached a final stage in the Anfal campaign of 1988. Some 1,200 villages were destroyed during this one year alone. It is estimated that 182,000 people died as a result of the Anfal campaign. The number of persons unaccounted for or killed during the three phases of the ethnic cleansing and Arabization campaign is estimated at 300,000. The total number of villages destroyed during all phases is estimated to be more than 4000.<br />
1988 Halabja: In March 1988, Iraq attacked the town of Halabja over three days using a mix of chemicals that resulted in the deaths of around 5,000 civilians immediately and many more over the next few years.<br />
1990 Sanctions: Under UN SCR-661 passed in August 1990, sanctions were imposed on Iraq with the intention of forcing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.<br />
1991 The Gulf War: Kurds were encouraged by the United States to rise up against the government and overthrow Saddam Hussein. The uprising began in March 1991. But coalition forces did not help the Kurds. At first, the Kurds were successful in driving out the Iraqi army from their territory but the Iraqi Army regrouped and crushed the rebellion. In the north, almost two million people fled Saddam's forces, seeking refuge in Iran and Turkey. International outrage forced the coalition and the UN to take action. The Kurdistan National Front was formed to organize an administration of public services for the area.<br />
1992 Elections: In May 1992, elections were held in the newly established Kurdish safe haven with international observers in attendance. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was formed and 105 Members of the Kurdistan National Assembly (the Parliament) were elected.<br />
1994 KDP-PUK Split: The fifty-fifty government split between these two parties fell apart and fighting broke out between them<br />
1996 Ceasefire: The KDP gained control of Erbil and the PUK withdrew to Sulaimaniyah. The two have maintained separate administrations from that point on.<br />
1998 The Washington Agreement. KDP and PUK representatives met in Washington in the fall of 1998. Although both parties accepted the Accord, it has not been fully implemented. Discussions and negotiations however are ongoing and currently there has been significant movement towards the resolution of issues.<br />
2002 Reconvening of the Kurdistan National Assembly: For the first time since 1994, the full Kurdistan National Assembly convened in Erbil on October 4, 2002.<br />
<div align="JUSTIFY"><br />
</div><b>NOTES</b><br />
1. See Martin Van Bruinessen, <i>Agha, Shaikh and State: the Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan</i> (London, 1992) and David McDowall, <i>A Modern History of the Kurds</i>, (London, 2000) for comprehensive studies of the Kurds in English, including extensive bibliographies. According to World Food Program (WFO) food registration figures, the population of KRG-administered Iraqi Kurdistan is approximately 3.7million today. Based on the 1957 census (the last reliable census) and Kurdish estimates of the number of Kurds who were forced to leave Kirkuk and other areas due to the regime’s policy of ethnic cleansing, there are well over one million Kurds in regime-controlled Iraq today, including Baghdad, Mosul and part of Iraqi Kurdistan. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that there are between 5 and 6 million Kurds in Iraq.<br />
2. See the Washington Kurdish Institute website <<a href="http://www.kurd.org/">http://www.kurd.org</a>> for links to human rights organizations that have documented the ethnic cleansing and Arabization campaign against the Kurds of Iraq, as well as the Anfal campaign and use of chemical and biological weapons on Kurdish towns and villages, including Halabja. See also Chapter 17, "The Road to Genocide," including footnotes and references, in McDowall. See Kenan Makiya, <i>The Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq</i> (Berkeley, CA, 1989) and <i>Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising and the Arab World</i> (New York, 1993). For a comprehensive analysis of the documents turned over by the Kurds to the U.S. in 1991 see Robert G. Rabil, "Operation ‘Termination of Traitors": The Iraqi Regime Through its Documents," <i>MERIA Journal</i>, Volume 6, Number 3, September 2002. See also the Harvard University Iraqi Research and Documentation Project (IRDP) website <<a href="http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~irdp">http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~irdp</a>><br />
3. See the Washington Kurdish Institute website under "Programs".<br />
4. According to the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the area of Iraqi Kurdistan under KRG administration amounts to 9% of the total land area of Iraq, which is 437,400 square kilometers. This makes KRG-administered Iraqi Kurdistan approximately 40,000 square kilometers which is roughly the same area as Switzerland (39,800). To compare with states in the United States, KRG-administered Iraqi Kurdistan is double the area of the State of Massachusetts (20,300 square kilometers).<br />
5. Contact the Kurdistan Regional Government <<a href="http://www.krg.org/">http://www.krg.org</a>> for a copy of the report on the 1992 elections. Observers included members of the Danish and Norwegian Refugee Councils.<br />
6. See the Human Right Watch/Middle East website <<a href="http://www.hrw.org/">http://www.hrw.org</a>> under the section "Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan".<br />
7. See the KRG/KDP <<a href="http://www.krg.org/">http://www.krg.org</a>> and KRG/PUK <<a href="http://www.puk.org/">http://www.puk.org</a>> websites for articles on the democratic experiment in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1991. See also Carole O’Leary, "A No-Fly, Yes Democracy Zone: Iraqi Kurdistan Offers a Model for a Post-Saddam Future," (<i>Washington Post</i>, Sunday, July 15, 2001) and Robin Wright, "Kurdish Enclave May Lead Way for New Iraq," <i>Los Angeles Times</i>, December 1, 2002.<br />
8. The parties that formed the Iraqi National Congress (including the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Iraqi National Accord, and the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq) publicly announced their support for federalism and the legitimate right of Iraq’s Kurds to self-determination in Salahadin in 1992, in the final statement of the Meetings of the Iraqi Congress National Assembly. The Iraqi National Congress reiterated its support in New York in 1999. Noted independent Iraqi intellectuals, including Kanan Makiya, Ghassan Attiyah, Munther Al Fadhal and Rend Rahim Francke, have also voiced their support for Kurdish self-determination and federalism.<br />
9. For example, the U.S. State Department has organized a ‘Democratic Principles Working Group’ which brings Iraqis together to flesh out a road map for democracy and federalism as part of its Future of Iraq project. For a regional perspective on the project see Mustapha Karkouti, "Post-Saddam Roadmap Envisions Federal State," <i>Gulf News</i>, December 5, 2002.<br />
10. "Iraqi Kurdistan: Ten years of self-rule and future prospects," an international conference hosted by the University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Demark, November 30 - December 1, 2002. Brendan O’Leary presented the keynote speech entitled "Right-sizing and right-peopling the state: Regulating national and ethnic differences." O’Leary holds the Stanley I. Sheerr Endowed Term Chair in the Social Sciences and is Director of the Solomon Asch Center for the Study of Ethno-political conflict, both at the University of Pennsylvania.<br />
11. See Michael Rubin’s article on "Federalism and the Future of Iraq" in <i>How to Build a New Iraq</i>, edited by Patrick Clawson (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002).<br />
12. Stability is this context refers to the establishment of a peaceful social and political environment wherein democratization and civil society building can take root. Stability as defined here rejects the notion that support for autocratic regimes in the Middle East promotes stability and is, therefore, in the U.S. strategic interest<br />
13. See the interview with U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz entitled "Wolfowitz Interviewed: Nobody Should Have Their Eyes on Kirkuk," in <i>Hurriyet</i>, December 5, 2002, by Sedat Ergin. See also my written testimony for the Congressional Human Rights Caucus briefing on "The Human Rights Situation in Northern Iraq: The Kurdish Minority and its Future," November 20, 2002, for a discussion of Kurdish concerns about U.S. plans for a military intervention, including role of Turkish forces in northern Iraq <<a href="http://www.house.gov/lantos/caucus/caucuswebpage.htm">http://ww.house.gov/lantos/caucus/caucuswebpage.htm</a>>, and Barbara Slavin, "Kurds Push U.S. for a Promise of Protection," <i>USA Today</i>, October 22, 2002.<br />
14. See the report by David Nissman entitled "Turkey to Set Up ‘Security Belt’ in Northern Iraq if U.S. Attacks," in the <i>Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Iraq Report</i>, Vol. 5. No. 34, October 18, 2002. In the report, Turkey’s Defense Minister, Sabahattin Cakmakoglu is quoted as stating: "The Turkish armed forces are a deterrent force both with respect to its size and its weapons….[And] if this deterrent force impedes the situation we do not want in Iraq, it will have completed its objective." Turkish tanks are positioned in areas inside the Kurdish safe haven, including Bamarni. During my July 02 visit to the Kurdish safe haven, I noted that the Turks had carved the Turkish flag (Crescent and Star) into the mountainside below where their tanks are stationed in the Berwari Bala area, between Kani Masi and Zakho. The number of Turkish troops currently in the Kurdish safe haven is perhaps 5000.<br />
<div align="JUSTIFY">15. The la<span style="font-size: small;">st reliable census in Iraq took place in 1957. It indicated that Kurds constituted the majority community in Kirkuk (48%). The number of Kurds and Turkoman in Iraq as a whole and in Kirkuk in particular will be determined by a new census in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.</span></div><div align="JUSTIFY"><span style="font-size: small;">16. See Robin Wright, " ‘Arabization’ Forces Iraqi Kurds to Flee From Homes<i>," Los Angeles Times</i>, December 3, 2002, for a description of Saddam’s ongoing ethnic cleansing campaign against the Kurds.</span></div><div align="JUSTIFY"><span style="font-size: small;">17. The original draft constitution for the establishment of Iraqi Kurdistan as a federal political unit in a post-Saddam federal Iraq can be accessed on the KDP/KRG website <<a href="http://www.krg.org/">http://ww.krg.org</a>>. Note that the draft document is currently being debated in the Kurdistan National Assembly and will surely be amended to reflect the positions of the PUK and other political parties represented in the regional assembly.</span></div><div align="JUSTIFY"><span style="font-size: small;">18. Michele Kambas, "Cyprus Peace Plan Gets Major Boost from Turkey," <i>Reuters</i> (Nov. 12, 2002), and Amy Waldman, "Sri Lanka to Explore a New Government," <i>New York Times</i> (December 6, 2002).</span></div><div align="JUSTIFY"><span style="font-size: small;">19. See note 7.</span></div><div align="JUSTIFY"><span style="font-size: small;">20. See Chapter 6 in Makiya’s Republic of Fear for a discussion of the treatment of Iraq’s non-Arab and Shi’a communities since the Mandate period, as well as an analysis of the construction of an Arab (Sunni) nationalist ideology, under the Baath.</span></div><span style="font-size: small;">21. Turkomans affiliated with the Turkish-backed Iraqi Turkoman Front reject this shared Kurdistani identity.</span><br />
<b><hr /></b><span style="font-size: small;"><a href="" name="Professor Carole A. O’Leary">Professor Carole A. O’Leary</a> is the Scholar-in-Residence for the Middle East Initiative at the American University Center for Global Peace. Professor O'Leary established a Future of Iraq Working Group at the Center in early 2001 to examine the premise that federalism is the best organizing framework for governance in a future Iraq. Since 1994, she has been an adjunct professor in the School of International Service, cross-appointed to the Divisions of International Peace and Conflict Resolution and Comparative and Regional Studies. With Charles MacDonald, she is the co-editor a volume entitled The Kurdish Identity in an Unsettled World that will be published in 2003.</span>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3872871571320054609.post-49343181917828938592011-10-04T02:48:00.000-07:002011-10-04T02:48:09.206-07:00Kirkuk: the heartland of Kurdistan<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhF57JK0P1DtRFmBns1V8MZYoMKT-1uZp7YN1NIkyPTzbHzvVGg0wRhx9l_8kcjQ6VFOqoeFC84ThVv8-AwQVIRniqvNFyEzixJVCus4b97pyjucRPrbmqb6gUD0_Vrk23z36EDu3yNhd8/s1600/Election+campaign+in+Kirkuk_0.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="214" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhF57JK0P1DtRFmBns1V8MZYoMKT-1uZp7YN1NIkyPTzbHzvVGg0wRhx9l_8kcjQ6VFOqoeFC84ThVv8-AwQVIRniqvNFyEzixJVCus4b97pyjucRPrbmqb6gUD0_Vrk23z36EDu3yNhd8/s320/Election+campaign+in+Kirkuk_0.JPG" width="320" /></a> Summary: The ancient city of Kirkuk is one of the oldest sites of continuous occupation in the region. <br />
<br />
It sits on archaeological remains that are 5,000 years old. Because of the strategic and geographic location of the city, Kirkuk had been the battleground of various empires, including the Mede Empire (the Kurdish ancestors) who controlled the city around the 7th or the 6th century BC. In the medieval era, Kirkuk was part of the ancient Wilayah of Sharazor, which had significant importance to Kurdistan's economy. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, the colonial powers divided Kurdistan, and then the Wilayah of Mosul (which the region of Kirkuk was a part) came under the British protectorate. At the beginning, the British had a plan to create a Kurdish state under their mandate and control all its natural resources. In 1921, the British estimated the population of Kirkuk to be 75,000 Kurds, 35,000 Turkmen, 10,000 Arabs, 1,400 Jews, and 600 Chaldeans. A Committee of the League of Nations, which visited the Wilayah of Mosul in 1925 todetermine its future, estimated that the Kurds in Kirkuk made up 63% of the population, the Turkmen 19%, and the Arabs 18%. The British colonial power that hid the potential of the region for its oil exploration from the French was completely aware of the economic importance of Kirkuk and surrounding areas. Finally, the artificial state of Iraq was created from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire and parts of the Kurdish region including Kirkuk were forcefully annexed to that in 1921. The discovery in 1927 of vast quantities of oil by the British explorers in Kirkuk marked the turning point in the modern history of the Kurds.Since the creation of modern state of Iraq, the Kirkuk region, rich in its oil fields and farms, has been one of the principal obstacles in finding a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question. All the Iraqi governments without any exception have tried to deny the historical and legal rights of the Kurds over their ancient city. For more than 80 years the oil fields of Kirkuk have been brought into use by the Iraqi regimes; these fields used to produce almost half of all Iraqi oil exports. In order to make sure it would stay like this, since the early stages of the new state of Iraq and particularly from 1963 onward, there have been continuous attempts by various Iraqi governments to transform the ethnic make-up of Kirkuk and its surrounding regions. There is no doubt that the vast amount of wealth from the oil fields of Kirkuk and surrounding areas has brought upon the Kurds nothing except misery, displacement, and genocide. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Iraqi governments--while aiming to grab more land from the Kurds--destroyed over 4,000 Kurdish villages. As Denis Natali, on page 58 of her book "The Kurds and the states: evolving the national identity in Iraq, Turkey and Iran," pointed out: "As the Iraqi state petrolized, the political elite started to ethnicize essential oil-rich Kurdish territories. Iraqi officials constructed a series of homes called the Arab Circle around the Kurdish regions in Kirkuk, deported Kurds from their homes, granted land deeds only to Arabs, and gave Kurdish localities Arabic names." During the 1960s, the money from the oil gave the central government a new type of power never before realized, and it was the early stages of full-scale state repression against the Kurds in the years to come. Indeed, the growing oil industry brought with it not only economic developments by a rapidly growing enterprise, but also the need for the state to secure the resource from any possible regional or internal threat.For the wider Middle Eastern region, the future of Kirkuk and indeed other disputed Kurdish territories in Iraq is of crucial importance.<br />
<br />
During all these years, the Iraqi governments have claimed their willingness to recognize the legitimacy of Kurdish national aspirations, but they have never kept their promises. The Autonomy Agreement of March 11, 1979, recognized the Kurdish political and cultural rights; however, it came short when it came to the judgment on the territorial extent of Kurdistan, especially the city of Kirkuk and the surrounding oilfields. The Ba'ath Regime claimed that a new census would determine the status of Kirkuk and other oil-rich Kurdish territories. Kurds were sure that such a census would have proven a Kurdish majority in all of these areas that the regime had denied to recognize as a part of future autonomous Kurdistan.<br />
<br />
But such a census never was held, and the legendary Kurdish leader, Mustafa Barzani, insisted on the inclusion of the Kirkuk oilfields to any autonomous agreement. In line with this argument, the author of an article named "Factual Accuracy Is Disputed" said that "Baghdad interpreted this as a virtual declaration of war, and, in March 1974, unilaterally decreed an autonomy statute. The new statute was a far cry from the 1970 Manifesto, and its definition of the Kurdish autonomous area explicitly excluded the oil-rich areas of Kirkuk, Khanaqin, and Shingal. In tandem with the 1970-74 autonomy process, the Iraqi regime carried out a comprehensive administrative reform in which the country's 16 provinces, or governorates, were renamed, and in some cases had their boundaries altered. The old province of Kirkuk was split in half. The area around the city itself was named Al-Ta'mim (nationalization), and its boundaries were redrawn to give an Arab majority." From then on, securing the oilfields of Kirkuk and surrounding areas continued behind policies of Arabicizing, and every subsequent Iraqi government followed that pattern, including the mass deportation of the Kurdish people from their ancestors' lands that was ordered by Saddam's regime from the late 1970s on. By the mid-1970s, the brutal A1/2Arabizatione campaigns of the Ba'ath Regime that seized power in 1968 embarked on a plan to alter the demographic makeup of the Kurdish city of Kirkuk and surrounding areas.<br />
<br />
This inhumane process was based on a concerted campaign that involved one of the most massive relocations of hundreds of thousands of Kurdish families from the oil-rich regions of Kirkuk and other areas, transforming them to purpose-built resettlement camps. Meanwhile, the Iraqi regime resettled thousands of Arab families (Shia Arabs from the south, and some Sunni populations from the center) in the Kurds' place in an attempt either to create the security buffer zone from the northern governorates or to simply increase Arab presence in certain areas. During the late 1980s, the Ba'ath government used chemical weapons against the Kurds and then started the brutal Anfal (genocide of the Kurdish people) campaigns, which was the final attempt to finish once and for all the Kurdish people from the Kirkuk region and the surrounding areas. These forced displacement policies of the Kurdish families continued during most of the 1990s until the fall of Saddam's regime in 2003. According to Human Right Watch, from the 1991 Gulf War until 2003, the former Iraqi government systematically expelled an estimated 120,000 Kurds and some Turkmen and Assyrians from Kirkuk and other towns and villages in this oil-rich region.After the fall of Saddam's regime in 2003, thousands of displaced Kurdish families and others returned to Kirkuk and other Arabicized regions to reclaim their homes and lands, which were and are occupied by Arabs from central and southern Iraq. While the Kurds have all legal and historical claims on Kirkuk as their ancestral homeland, they patiently have avoided taking back the city through violence and extreme measures. However, the Kurds have made clear to everyone that Kirkuk is everything to them. Therefore, as one of the main victims of Saddam Hussein's Arabization efforts, Kirkuk has come to symbolize the injustice the Kurds suffered at his hands-and its annexation to the KRG is the only way to remedy it. Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law, which was considered the Constitution of Iraq that dissolved the Iraqi Governing Council, states in part: "The Iraqi Transitional Government shall act expeditious measures to remedy the injustice caused by the previous regime's practice in the demographic character of certain regions, including Kirkuk, by deporting and expelling from their place of residence and forcing migration in and out of the region." (This is from the same article mentioned above, "Factual Accuracy Is Disputed.")The Kurds patiently witnessed that Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law was replaced with Iraq's 2005 Constitution, including a provision, Article 140, to resolve these competing claims. Article 140 consists of three steps: 1) Normalization: the return of Kurds and other residents of Kirkuk displaced by the Arabization campaigns; 2) census to determine the make-up of the province's population; 3) a referendum to determine Kirkuk's status. This process was supposed to have been completed by the end of 2007, but neither a census nor a referendum has been completed because of unresolved disputes between Iraq's Arabs and Kurds. Rather, the government postponed the deadline by six months to June 2008, and then the United Nations attempted to broker a solution outside the Article 140 framework, but the final result hasn't been disclosed yet. Today, the dispute over Kirkuk has spilled over into every corner of national politics, and it seems that it is getting worse day by day.<br />
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The new electoral law for new elections, which will be held in January of next year, took weeks of debate among lawmakers, and it was only after U.S., UN, and regional power pressure that the way was paved by Parliament for the new law to be passed. By upholding the implementation of Article 140, the future of Iraq is moving toward an uncertain future- and no doubt that those who are resisting to accept the new Iraq and power-sharing with the Kurds are the main factors in breaking up this country. <br />
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Copyright 2006 - 2009 The Kurdish GlobeUnknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3872871571320054609.post-31619230431578808152011-08-31T10:27:00.000-07:002011-08-31T10:27:41.325-07:00Troubled Times - A Brief History Of Kurdistan<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0"><tbody>
<tr><td><span class="article_text"> <span class="article_title">Troubled Times - A Brief History Of Kurdistan</span><br />
By Lee Ridley - Photography by Charlotte Mann<br />
Mar 15, 2005,<br />
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<tr> <td><span class="image_caption">Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin.</span></td> </tr>
</tbody></table>The unofficial country of Kurdistan occupies a region steeped in history; a history, that is, of bloody turmoil, occupation and assimilation. When the Medes (descended from the Aryans) first arrived in the region around 1000 B.C. the stage was set for a protracted and arduous battle for supremacy against the neighbouring Assyrians and Persians. For centuries, the Medes fought against their would-be occupiers until, around 600 B.C., having already defeated the Persians, they overcame the Assyrians and formed the Median Empire. That Empire covered all of what we today call Kurdistan.<br />
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Various tribes living in the region were not forced to renounce their cultures and conform to their new hosts’. Rather their cultures were adopted and national values were formed. In 550 B.C however, the Persians re-emerged as the dominant force and from that time forward the region was rarely without conflict. Persians, Greeks, Arabs, Armenians, Romans and Byzantines have all waged battles in the region, and the local people found themselves driven into the mountains just to afford themselves a better chance of survival. Tribalism became very strong under these conditions and this, in turn, weakened their ability to form any meaningful, army of resistance against determined assailants. When the Arabs took control in the 7th century, Islam was introduced, and national identity irrevocably eroded, making it almost impossible for the people to resist future attempts at occupation.<br />
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The Turks first arrived on the scene in the 11th century and have largely remained in control to the present day, only relinquishing part of the territory to the advancing Ottomans in the last century. Existing, established cultures and Islamic ideologies continued. Throughout all of these bloody years, the people encamped in the mountains never fully fell under the control of the occupying forces and were always ready and determined to resist attempts at any kind of assimilation. This stance of resistance is an innate characteristic of the people still today, and from their mountain hideouts they proudly defy outside influence, and continue to fight to protect their existence and freedom.<br />
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Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, the Turkish, British and French drew up and signed two treaties - the Treaty of Ankara in 1921 and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. The result of these treaties was the annexation of Kurdistan into its modern day host countries - Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. Unfortunately for the Kurdish people, the condition of internal disarray and predominantly feudal, tribal structure precluded Kurdistan from being made its own autonomous state at the time, despite conditions looking otherwise favourable.<br />
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</tbody></table>In Turkey, as the central government took hold, local authorities were abolished and a programme of intimidation and, in some instances, wholesale massacre initiated. The intention was to discourage the Kurds from political activity and harbouring any ideas of a revolt against the state; however, the sheer determination and resolve of the Kurdish people cannot be underestimated and in 1978, the PKK (Kurdish Worker’s Party) formed and embarked on a violent retaliation against the Turkish military and Republic at large.<br />
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</tbody></table>Over a period of 20 years, bombing campaigns in Ankara and Istanbul claimed many lives along with the disappearance of a large number of schoolteachers in East Turkey, claimed by the PKK to be government spies. The Turkish military, on <br />
the other hand, weren’t so covert and engaged in a widespread “cleansing” campaign in which thousands of Kurdish mountain villages in the East of the country were systematically burned out and razed to the ground, leaving huge numbers of people homeless with nothing more than the clothes in which they stood. Reports of customary executions in front of burning homes were also common.<br />
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</tbody></table>The capture of PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in 1999; his subsequent call for a unilateral ceasefire, and Turkey’s aspirations of joining the European Union, have all had the effect of quelling hostilities on both sides. Sporadic forays still occur, but the undercurrent of tension is far more subtle now than in recent years. A foreign visitor to the region is most likely to be more concerned with events to the south, in battle-ravaged Iraq, than with the thought of his or her own safety in what was, until very recently, a no-go area for tourists. <br />
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The people, Kurds and Turks alike, are friendly and hospitable towards tourists, if not each other, and enjoy nothing more than inviting a passer-by in for a glass of tea. Of course, carpet sellers are the keenest to do this, for obvious reasons, and you know you’re being lined up for a bit of patter, when a dark room is transformed into a floodlit shop floor, and your gracious host starts instructing his staff to unfurl carpets, rugs and kilims at your feet. Steely resolve is called for if you are to resist becoming the proud owner of a new carpet, but regardless of the outcome, plentiful tea is a certainty and a friend for life a distinct possibility.<br />
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Azure lakes, snow-topped mountains, waterfalls, ancient churches and crumbling fortresses await the few tourists that venture this far east in Turkey, although five-star amenities are few and far between and are likely to remain so for many years to come. With the nearest sandy shore many hundreds of miles to the west, and Iraq only a short drive to the south, package tourists aren’t likely to be found in abundance here. <br />
For some, that may be reason enough to come.<br />
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Author – Lee Ridley.<br />
Photography - Charlotte Mann.<br />
</span>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3872871571320054609.post-20269545222973677022011-06-22T08:02:00.000-07:002011-08-08T01:23:51.771-07:00The first Kurdish Textbook from 1860<h2>The first Kurdish Textbook from 1860</h2><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhSldRooNB88uNvxo6t_tJgSJU-Zonh5oo1r6x7LFfvAqxTJtbuvNDqhVQRf2f2cG1Sv_0kMgMmdD5Tg9SQnvyaqkiWWC1oBOsIAiSlK9KhLwkY2YmByRc8_851MJHEWdS1a6lRN4nK6gE/s1600/thumb.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="640" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhSldRooNB88uNvxo6t_tJgSJU-Zonh5oo1r6x7LFfvAqxTJtbuvNDqhVQRf2f2cG1Sv_0kMgMmdD5Tg9SQnvyaqkiWWC1oBOsIAiSlK9KhLwkY2YmByRc8_851MJHEWdS1a6lRN4nK6gE/s640/thumb.jpg" width="419" /></a></div><h2> </h2><h2></h2><h2></h2><h2>This is the cover page of the first ever Kurdish Textbook in Armenian alphabet. This book was published in 1860 in Yerevan. KAL celebrating 150th anniversary of Kurdish textbook and modern learning. KAL has entire book which will be scanned and posted online sue to course. </h2><h2> </h2><h2 class="rtecenter"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/goog_917472671"> </a><a class="ext" href="http://www.calameo.com/read/000504709a62d40c6b5dc" target="_blank">View this textbook in full</a><span class="ext"></span></h2><h2> </h2><span class="submitted"></span>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3872871571320054609.post-56525448625893638032011-06-21T12:17:00.000-07:002011-06-21T12:17:35.500-07:00Some Notes On The Medes<div style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;">It is now over a half century since a Russian politician and Scholar, Minorsky, suggested Kurds might have been descendants of two Median tribes (Kyrtioi and Mardioi) mentioned in classical Greek accounts. Although his theses was soon criticized thanks two progress in the studies on Iranic languages, however, it was kept alive by some Kurdish nationalists especially in southern Kurdistan, where due to Arabic/Semitic oppression felt need of a strong Iranic predecessor which could have blew power of the mighty Semitics (Ancient Assyria). Ironically it is now known that Medes had never set their feet on Assyria. Not only this, the very Median ''Empire'' is now proven to be incorrect and a myth created in the imagination of later Greek authors. <br />
<img height="319" id="il_fi" src="http://www.artarena.force9.co.uk/Image/media.gif" style="padding-bottom: 8px; padding-right: 8px; padding-top: 8px;" width="400" /><br />
There are indications that there might have existed an ambiguous loose confederation of Median tribes. Even the dominion of this imaginative Median confederation has shrunk. According to Prauda conference : <i>''In recent years, however, the “Median Empire” has lost most of its supposed “provinces” and “dependent kingdoms,” including Persis and Elam (although the status of Elam has been disputed for a long time), Assyria, Northern Syria, Armenia and Cappadocia . . . The eastern Median provinces including Drangiana, Parthia, and Aria may also have been “liberated” though the sources are largely silent about their status. How much more territory the Medes will lose in the next years is difficult to assess.''</i><br />
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Looking for archaeological findings, so far, nothing which could be related to the Medes has been found. Although there are a few archaeological sites from the period when the Medes existed, but it is not certain at all that these really belonged to the Medes and not to other contemporary peoples, such as Scythians and Kimmerians, <br />
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Even on linguistic grounds there are not satisfatcory evidence for the Median language. According to Schmitt who tried to reconstruct the Median language our knowledge on their language does not lay on good bases. As with possible relation of Median language with Kurdish, already in early 1960s Mckenzie dismissed the claim that Kurdish is Modern Median. Nowadays, it is central Iranian dialects that are regards as possible offshoots of Median.<br />
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One of interesting points which Mckenzie relies on is the very name of the Median capital ''hangmatana''. This word which meant ''place of gathering'' and contains the verb ''agmata'' one of two Iranic lexemes for ''to come'' used in Median and Old Persian, clearly shows the irrelevancy of Median to Kurdish. Kurdish on the other hand uses the verb ''hatin'' from old Iranic ''agata''. This is used even in Balouchi (spoken in the territory of ancient Sakastan), in language of the Parthians, whose aristocracy (royal family) were of of east Scythian origin (Dahae Parni), and in all eastern Iranic languages. There are other lexemes and phonemes which relate Kurdish with eastern Iranic language which are believed to have been under heavy influence of east Scythian dialects.<br />
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As noted briefly above, there are good evidence, on at least three important grounds, namely historic, archeological and linguistics, which disproves the claim that Medes are direct predecessors of the Kurds.</div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3872871571320054609.post-29471903834083557522011-06-18T02:52:00.000-07:002011-06-18T02:52:11.222-07:00PîremêrdTawfeq Mahmoud Hamza or Piramerd, (Pîremêrd in Kurdish), (1867-1950), was a Kurdish poet , writer, novelist and journalist. He was born in the Gwêje neighborhood of Sulaimaniya city in Iraqi Kurdistan.<br />
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He studied Arabic and Islamic Fiqh in Sulaimaniya, and Baneh in Iran. From 1882 to 1895, he worked as an employee for different local government offices in Sulaimaniya, Halabja, Sharbazher (Şarbajêr). In 1898, he was invited by the Ottoman Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid II to Istanbul where he stayed for one year. Then he went to Hajj pilgrimage and he was also given the title of Bey by the Sultan. After this, his title became Haji Tawfeq Bey. He met Wafaei, Kurdish poet, during the pilgrimage. In 1899, he was appointed as a member of the High Majlis of Istanbul. Within the same period, he was admitted to the faculty of law in Istanbul. In 1907, he became a member of the Kurdish organization Komela Kurd in Istanbul. From 1909 to 1923, he served as the governor of several districts in Turkey and Kurdistan, among them Hakkari (Kurdish: Çolemêrg), Qeremursil, Balawa, Beytüşşebap (in Şırnak Province), Gumuskoy, Adapazarı and Amasya. In 1925, he returned to Sulaimaniya via Baghdad. In 1926, he became the editor of the Kurdish newspaper Jîyan and in 1932 he was promoted to the post of Manager. In 1938, he changed the name of the newspaper to Jîn, and continued publishing it until 1950. He is also credited for the establishment of the first private Kurdish school in Kurdistan called Qutabxaney Zanistî (Scientific School).<br />
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Literary works</span><br />
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Editing and Translation of Poems of Mawlawi Kurd from Hawrami dialect to Sorani, 1935.<br />
The Tragedy of Mam and Zin, Play, 1935. (This book is different from the well-known work of Ahmad Khani)<br />
The Story of the Twelve Knights of Mariwan, 1935.<br />
The Story of Mahmoud Agha Shiwakal, 1942.<br />
Galte û Gep, A collection of Kurdish Folklore, 1947.<br />
Kemançejen, Translation of a novel from Turkish, 1942.<br />
Editing of the collection of poems of Mawlana Khalid Naqshbandi(The Kurdish sufi).<br />
Editing and Translation of Poems of Besarani from Hawrami dialect to Sorani.<br />
Articles about Kurdish history, the history of Baban principality and Jaf tribes.<br />
Collection of Poems<br />
Encamî Pîyawî Bengkêş (The fate of an addict), short story, Gelawêj Journal, 1941.<br />
Zoremilî Milşikanî le dûwaye (Aggression leads to defeat), short story, Gelawêj Journal, 1942.<br />
Felsefey Kiçe Kurdêk (The philosophy of a Kurdish girl), short story, Gelawêj Journal, 1942.<br />
Xiramî, Kay kon, short story, Jîyan newspaper, no.483, 1936.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3872871571320054609.post-51291629172948885142011-06-17T11:44:00.001-07:002011-06-17T11:44:36.629-07:00Kurds and Flowers<h1 align="center">Kurds and Flowers</h1><div align="center">by Yassin Aref</div><div align="left">Those who are suffering, going through a lot of difficulty—their lives are miserable, threatened by war and poverty, struggling to find jobs and to get food. It’s really hard for them to see the beauty in life and nature or to understand the meaning of it! While looking at something, this does not mean we have seen it, and seeing it does not mean we feel it!! I am not going to debate with philosophers about what is beauty:</div><ul><li>is there anything by itself that can be either ugly or beautiful?</li>
<li>or is that only the best way we see it?</li>
</ul>And no doubt, the way we see things is the best of the way we think, love, and believe. If you bring the ugliest baby, in the eyes of his mom he is the most beautiful one!! This is also true: maybe something looks very nice to my eye, but to your eye it is just ugly! In Arabic they say, “The sick one whose mouth is bitter (who has a sore throat), if you give him sweet cold water, it will be bitter for him.” <br />
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<tr> <td><div align="center"><strong>Nergz</strong></div></td> </tr>
</tbody></table> As Kurds, we think our land is very beautiful, many say it is like paradise on earth:<br />
<ul><li>high, high mountains covered with snow in the winter, and by flowers in the spring and summer</li>
<li>rivers, canals, sweet cold running water in most parts of it</li>
<li>flying birds with different songs, especially in the morning</li>
<li>all kinds of flowers, filling the air with perfume</li>
</ul>But most of us never enjoyed it. Our situation and tragic life did not help us see that beauty, or feel it. Instead, for the most part, we covered [hid?] our culture, history, and literature (stories and poems). We reached the point that we were ashamed to talk about beauty or to try to tell any romantic story. This made most of our classic poets use the infinite love of God and the beauty of his Messenger to write about. People [in our literature] cried because of separation, they waited patiently for a meeting, they begged to seek a face, their hearts boiled for love, etc.—but all of this was a symbol for God’s meaning and love. Even most of the poems about bright eyes, black hair, a sunny face, a tall body, [ ], and beloved one, applied to the Messenger. And this was the only way for someone to express him or herself. I was fortunate; from my childhood on, I liked stories and loved poems, which really helped me to endure the hardships. I overcame them by reading poems about the beauty of my land, the love of my nation, saying the truth, facing death, opposing humiliation, having hope, looking forward and feeling great!<br />
I believe strongly that everyone should learn how he can see and feel the beauty of life and nature. Many people are very fortunate [capable], but they don’t know! [how to do this]. Let me tell you this story, maybe it will make clear for you what I mean when I say we all need to learn how we can see and feel the beauty of nature.<br />
I grew up in a village, and I lived with nature. There was not anything to prevent us from nature: drinking from springs and canals, cooking over a wood fire, eating from our farm, using fresh vegetables and fruits, looking for the shade of a tree and waiting for the cool wind in summer. Sitting and sleeping on the floor, walking in the light of the moon at night, listening to the symphony of the birds in the morning, riding a horse and donkey for traveling and moving. There was no electricity, no car, no TV, no phone, no mail—all this made my early life close to nature in my village. There was a spring that made a small canal, that everyone depended on for drinking and cooking, there was no running water in the village in any house. <br />
As part of the culture, only women went to bring water for cooking and washing. But my mom was sick all her life, with no treatment, and had no daughter, so many times in the summer at night, when no women brought water, I used to go and bring water to help my mom. I would look at the moon following me, then stopping on my head, reflecting in the water—but I never felt this was something really beautiful until I read the poem of Abdullah Goran (one of the famous realistic Kurdish poets), about exactly what I was doing many times, as he said:<br />
<blockquote> <blockquote> The spring looks like silver<br />
Shining under the moonlight<br />
You see the small pebbles and rocks<br />
Moving under the water<br />
Shining like pearl and coral <br />
</blockquote></blockquote>Since I read this poem, I started looking at the same spring as though it was silver, because of the yellow light from the moon, and I saw the small rocks and pebbles in the canal under the water as though they were pearl and coral. I started to enjoy my job of bringing the water, and I began tasting that [silver] water, which made me feel happy and good. And this is the role of the artist and poet: to show us the beauty of nature, and to teach us to see it and feel it.<br />
I never heard, read, or said the word “beauty,” I only remembered the flower [<em>nergz</em>] that is the simple symbol of love, beauty, and softness. From my culture, and from Kurdish poems, I learned to look at this flower as:<br />
<ul><li>the blood of our murders</li>
<li>our land’s symbol</li>
<li>the sign of love and softness</li>
</ul>Kurdish history is long, full of sacrifice, mostly tragic, but it’s clear that our struggle was for liberty, justice, and our rights. We are proud that we never occupied anyone’s land, and we did not deny any nation’s existence. But they murdered us on our land, in our homes, for being Kurdish. We walk our land very humbly; we look at the dirt (soil) as though it’s the body and bones of [all who] were murdered. We look at the flowers as our youths’ blood—that is why they’re red and sweet-smelling. This is what our poets told us: we can see the flowers everywhere because they murdered us everywhere, and we can see whole bunches of flowers together because they buried us in mass graves. I was a teenager when I imitated some Kurdish poets in their philosophy, and I wrote this poem (this is part of it):<br />
<blockquote> <blockquote> Please, my dear mom,<br />
Let me go to the mountains <br />
To make the Kurdish dream come true,<br />
Or die there and become a flower<br />
</blockquote></blockquote><strong><em>Nergz</em>, Symbol of Kurdistan</strong><br />
As much as winter is hard in Kurdistan, as much as snow falls to cover the mountains and villages and to close the roads, and hide the hills and trees—people look for the <em>nergz</em>, the Kurdish lily that grows in spring, kissing the mountains and valleys, spreading perfume on the air, giving glad tidings that spring is coming. There are many books and collected poems about <em>nergz</em>. It’s the sign of new life, it’s the end of hardship. It’s the gift of the lover, smiling, shining to everyone—things will change, life is beautiful, and we will remain––telling of spring coming, making us feel good, giving us hope and teaching us to be kind and soft, to not carry anything but love. From March to May, wherever you go <em>nergz</em> are welcoming you—kissing every house, each store, all the cars—people sending them to each other, boys carrying bunches of them in their hands, girls putting [pinning] them on their chest. Everyone greets each other by <em>nergz</em>! When they rise and show it to you, that means love, best wishes, stay strong, look for change, the storm is over. People know and understand this without words; all they need to do is show the <em>nergz</em>.<br />
In 1986, I wrote a poem about this: <br />
<blockquote> <blockquote> I smell <em>nergz</em>, it’s telling me<br />
Spring is here <br />
I like spring, it’s started by Nawroz *<br />
I love Nawroz, it’s the story<br />
That shows me the road to liberty<br />
</blockquote></blockquote><em>* Nawroz is the Kurdish national day, the beginning of the Kurdish new year (3/21), and Independence Day.</em><br />
We suffered a lot, and were lonely; no one accepted us; our existence, our being, had been denied; we did not get love from the West, we did not see sympathy from the East, [and because of this] our fathers worked hard to make sure our tough life and rough situation did not shape us because of the lack of love and sympathy. Instead they showed us flowers, gave us <em>nergz</em>, told us proverbs about flowers to soften our hearts and make us kind. There are many examples of teaching by flowers. I share with you three of these Kurdish proverbs.<br />
<strong>1. <em>Gul naska</em> (A Flower Is Soft)</strong><br />
I know this is not our discovery, and you don’t need to study philosophy to learn it. All you need [to do] is to touch the flower, care for it—so why do Kurds think this is from their fathers’ wisdom? The answer is simple, just like Kurdish life: they are repeating this, and asking their children to take care of flowers, to train them to act soft, to help them see the beauty, to balance all the hardship and violence they see in their lives. This is human nature. When a person sees violence, his life is tough and he suffers; this makes his heart become hard. Anything we see or do will affect out hearts and thinking in one way or another! Today the U.S. government spends billions of dollars on psychiatric programs to train those who came back from battle to have a normal life, but there was no normal life for Kurds. Their schools, farms, mosques, villages, and homes—all were battlefields, they were attacked wherever they were! And yet they need to teach their children to love, and be kind. What they have is their experience, and the most kind and lovely thing they can see is flowers. They use flowers in their poems, stories, and proverbs to give an example of how much a flower is soft, how it will die in cold and hot weather, how it will fail under a “strong wing,” how if you care for it you can’t [withhold] “rain”—this is the only way to see a bright future and to get a “good scent” from it. <br />
Taking care of flowers was a training school for us, teaching us how we could live and deal with women too! As long as women have been part of Kurdish culture, they have been flowers; the most famous names for women in Kurdish are names of flowers. There are thousands of such names. Each is the name of a girl in Kurdistan. It’s part of our culture that a man can’t be soft, like flowers, but must be strong enough to sleep in the snow, walk in the desert, run faster than the wind, protect himself from the wolf, and protect the women in his family too. But a good woman is the one who is very kind and soft, just like a flower.<br />
But many men failed to keep flowers in their lives, one of them was my dad. The hardships and poverty, the war and calamity, took him over. I never saw my mom’s face bright, like Galabakh, Hero, or Nergz (names of flowers in Kurdistan), but she was a dying flower. Her sickness was apparent in her face, she was forty years old but she looked like she was seventy. I can’t blame my dad, who himself was a victim. The challenge was much bigger than his power and ability, but [at the time] I was sure that didn’t matter [or affect] what was happening [to my mother]. <br />
I am going to keep my flower [my wife] bright. I tried in Kurdistan, but it was not possible for me to keep my promise, and I had no choice but to flee (immigrate). I went to Syria, where it was not easy for a foreigner like me to live, then I came to America, where I thought I left suffering and fear behind. Poverty is over!, I thought, and we will be brighter than flowers! But all this remains as a dream, realizing that I have gone through more here than whatever I saw in my ruined country. And my wife’s life has become harder than my mom’s: left alone to suffer, be fearful, and worry, crying and always being sad, she almost lost her mind. Even for myself: how much I was proud that I was my father’s son, a son of mountains, thinking I could endure anything, that I would eat rocks and remain strong—but this is not a physical challenge. It’s invisible pain, it’s something we never heard of. It’s something that has affected my children and changed their lives, something that grays my hair. Now, when someone sees me, he gives my age at least 15 years older than the age I am! <br />
But I do not worry about that, I’m a cultured person—a man doesn’t want to be bright and soft like a flower. But if he is really a man, he should keep his wife that way. My dear, I am sorry. I did nothing to cause you all of this pain—I really wanted to make you happy, to help you stay brighter than <em>nergz</em>, it was not my fault. We are just the victims of a wrong policy, as were all the Kurdish victims during our entire Kurdish history. I did not expect that your life in America in the twenty-first century would be harder than my mom’s in her isolated area in a third world country during the first half of the twentieth century. Please look forward, and never give up. <br />
<strong>2. <em>Agar gul nit drkish maba</em> (If You Are Not a Flower, Don’t Be a Thorn)</strong><br />
Many of us give or hear daily an excuse for not doing the good or right thing. The need for us to do good things [is obvious], and it is easy to give the reason—but everyone has [also] said “I can’t”! The best of my experience is that most of the time, there is no big difference between saying “I can’t,” or “I will do it later,” or “I will try,” or “Let me think about it,” or “I am sorry, but no”—all are really the same reasons. They are just polite ways to say NO! But this proverb closes the door on those who give excuses all the time. It tells them that it’s fine if you can’t or don’t want to do such and such good thing—but please at least stop doing bad things! Of course, no one has the right to say, “I can’t stop doing such and such thing,” because stopping something doesn’t cost you any physical activity. If you just have a sincere intention to do something or stop something, then it will be over and you won’t do it. When someone asked the Prophet about [doing] good things, or [giving] charity, saying such and such—by the end of their question He told them, if you can’t do these things, just save people from the harm that your “charity” does to them. It’s really great if every single one of us stops harming and abusing others—or at least stops being a “thorn,” as this Kurdish proverb says. Most of our pain and suffering will then be over.<br />
Yes, we need to be flowers, and brighten people’s lives, give them something that “smells good” and makes them feel good—but if we fail to do that, we must not be “thorns.” Kurds use this proverb a lot when someone who intends to speak some good words and mentions something nice to help make peace between two sides, says things that [actually] do not help—they tell him that if you are not a flower, then don’t be a thorn. If you don’t have something good to say, don’t say a bad thing. If you cannot help to build back relationships, don’t destroy them. If you can’t make something easier, don’t make it harder. If you don’t give, don’t take! I strongly believe that this is the first step, and every single person’s responsibility. We must start from ourselves. It’s simple and it’s easy. It’s possible; it’s the Kurdish way. <br />
I invite you: “If you are not a flower, don’t be a thorn.” But my wish and hope is that you go one step further and become a beautiful bright flower that everyone loves to see, someone who makes everyone feel good [because] you saw a chance [to do something good for others].<br />
<strong>3. <em>Ba gulek bahar naya</em> (When You See One Flower, That Doesn’t Mean It’s Spring)</strong><br />
Some years in Kurdistan, when the weather is mild at the end of February or the beginning of March, the <em>nergz</em> and other kinds of flowers will bloom. Some of them will take their chances and think spring is here—but all of a sudden, a storm proves they were wrong. From this, Kurds say that one flower can’t bring spring! And this proverb is used to tell people not to be extremely [overly] hopeful, and not to let one good word or one good act deceive you. Search deeper, and understand the nature of change, and the best of the perfect reasons; it’s through big changes, not the act of one individual! <br />
[On the other hand,] cold, snow, and storms of winter can’t remove even one flower from the spring; no one is able to do everything by himself. Even the Messengers were not able to do what they did without their followers and supporters. No big leader made big changes without his army or good advisors; no artist or writer made a difference without his readers or supporters. It’s good to think positively and be hopeful, but it’s wrong to be extremely [overly] positive, and when you see one good man in the city, [it’s wrong] to think that there are no bad ones or cheaters there, or when you hear one good word [it’s wrong] to [automatically] think that person is excellent. No, it’s the Kurdish expression telling you to wait and search, find the reason, see all the signs before making your decision. Seeing one flower does not mean it’s spring! Don’t reject this proverb, and don’t be as emotional as this Kurdish lover/singer said:<br />
<blockquote> <blockquote> It’s not true when they say<br />
One flower does not bring the spring<br />
My winter will become spring<br />
If my flower [beloved one] is with me!<br />
</blockquote></blockquote>Such a “spring” is just emotional and personal, but real spring for everyone needs lots of flowers. Please, just be one of them. Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3872871571320054609.post-60205643982797383342011-06-17T11:41:00.000-07:002011-06-17T11:41:52.876-07:00Nawroz (New Day)<div style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><br />
</div><br />
<h1 align="center">Nawroz (New Day)</h1><div align="center"><strong>by Yassin Aref </strong></div><br />
<a href="http://www.kuma.org.uk/announces/announces-012_clip_image002.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="250" id="il_fi" src="http://www.kuma.org.uk/announces/announces-012_clip_image002.jpg" style="padding-bottom: 8px; padding-right: 8px; padding-top: 8px;" width="400" /></a>Nawroz is a Persian word (“naw” means “new” and “roz” means day). For Kurds and Iranians, Nawroz is the beginning of the new year. It falls on March 21, the first day of spring. It’s not easy to find the exact root of this day, there are many stories about it, but it’s really hard to confirm them. Some stories are just ancient tales. Kurds, Persians and Afghans celebrate Nawroz and each look at it as their national day, but Kurds look at it as independence day and the historical day for our “big victory.” From many theories about [the origin of] Nawroz, these three are reasonable!<br />
1. Some believe Nawroz’s root goes back to the Persian fire worshippers [Zoroastrianism]. Opening a fire and dancing and singing around it was just one form of their worship of fire. From them, this practice came to us.<br />
2. It is just the sign for the new season (spring), and people celebrate it because the snow and winter will end and the weather will start to warm up. People don’t have to remain in their homes anymore, and they open the fire on the mountain to show that the snow is going to melt.<br />
3. The Kurdish version of Nawroz is that there was a tyrant named Zuhak who wanted to end the Kurds and genocide them. Historical storytellers say that Zuhak got sick and two snakes came onto his two shoulders and refused to eat anything except human brains. So Zuhak, to spare his own brain, had to slaughter two youths every day and give their brains to the snakes. Of course, he chose to sacrifice Kurds, and his gardener would bring two Kurdish heads for him every day. This went on for awhile. <br />
But a Kurdish blacksmith in the city named Kawa had three sons, two of whom already had been taken to Zuhak. When they came back to take Kawa’s last son and give his brain to the snakes, Kawa said “No!” and started calling out to the people, and kept beating the iron anvil with his hammer until many people in the city came to him. He told them, “Listen, they are going to slaughter all of us one by one, and we should do something to stop them.”<br />
The people asked, “What can we do, and how can we stop them?”<br />
Kawa told them, “We should go all together, and maybe we can kill Zuhak, or maybe we will all die together—which is much better than dying separately, after we have lost all our children and endured all kinds of humiliation.”<br />
The people said, “If you lead us, we are with you.”<br />
Kawa agreed, and they marched toward Zuhak’s castle. When they reached the gate Kawa broke the lock and opened the gate. When Zuhak’s guards saw that, they started to flee. No one stayed to defend Zuhak, so Kawa and his people went inside and brought Zuhak out.<br />
And they got rid of him.<br />
Now they needed to inform people and give them the glad tidings that none of their sons would be taken anymore, but how could they tell the people? There was no radio at that time, no TV, no phone, no newspapers…so they went to the top of the highest mountain or hill and opened a fire. Then to inform people that this fire was the sign of happiness, they started dancing and singing around it. Many people saw them and got the message. Since then, this day has been the beginning of the Kurdish year*, and Kurds look at this day as independence day and celebrate their victory by opening a fire on the highest place they can reach, and by singing patriotic songs and dancing Kurdish dances around the fire. This is the most accurate narration about Nawroz (without the snakes story), and the only one that is acceptable to Kurds. This is why Kurds still celebrate Nawroz: we look at it as our national day for independence. For us, there were many reasons to celebrate Nawroz, but certainly none of them had anything to do with religion or any action of worship. For us it is the day of freedom, the history of justice, and the nation’s victory.<br />
<table border="0" style="width: 402px;"><tbody>
<tr> <td><img alt="Nawroz" height="421" src="http://www.yassinaref.com/images/Narwroz.jpg" width="450" /></td> </tr>
</tbody></table> These are the three main reasons and meanings of Nawroz for Kurds:<br />
1. Nawroz is a challenge<br />
This is the biggest reason: we challenge the Kurdish denial and the genocider, and demonstrate Kurdish nationality and existence. By Nawroz, we send the enemy a message:<br />
<ul><ul><li>We are Kurds, we still exist, and we have a history. No one can end us.</li>
<li>No matter how much they kill and disappear us—we are Kawa’s nation and a dictator’s end will be the same as Zuhak’s. [In my experience,] the dictator [Saddam] understood this, and that’s why [the army] used to prevent us from celebrating, and would arrest whoever participated and disappear many of our youth for participating in Nawroz. Then it was changed from a Kurdish holiday to the spring holiday and trees day, to let people celebrate it as the beginning of spring—but we refused! We celebrated it only as Nawroz, Kawa’s victory, and our independence day!</li>
</ul></ul>2. Nawroz is independence day for Kurds<br />
Today, every nation and country has a day that is called “national day” or “independence day.” These are used as opportunities to feed the people and make them patriots. The Kurds used Nawroz for this purpose very successfully. For centuries, there have been thousands of patriotic songs, poems and stories about Nawroz, and the fire of Nawroz burned our youths’ hearts and minds and made them not escape [shy away] from anything, and pushed them to sacrifice their lives for their nation and freedom. There is no Kurdish [tradition], people only memorize songs and poems about this, but many of the songs became Kurdish revolutionary songs, and for decades one was used as a national song:<br />
“AMROZI SALI TAZAYA NAWROZA HATAWA<br />
JAZNEKI KONI KURDA BAXOSHIO BAHTAWA”<br />
which means, “Today is the new year, Nawroz has come back. The historic Kurdish festival brings happiness.”<br />
Nawroz told us: as long as it will take, and however much winter will be cold and hard, Nawroz will come, and spring is in front of us! And no matter how much our enemy will kill and destroy, Kawa will come, and victory is for us!<br />
I do not believe there is any Kurdish poet, especially in the 20th century, who has no poem about Nawroz. Many [of these] poems were collected in 1986 in a book named <em>Nawroz Letters</em>. I was just 16 years old when Mohamed Abdul Rahman Zangana collected the first book of <em>Nawroz Letters</em>. I wrote a poem [about Nawroz] and sent it to him. He said the first volume was done, but he would put it in the second volume. After that, I don’t know what happened, but certainly my first poem was about Nawroz:<br />
<blockquote> <strong>Nawroz<br />
</strong>Our national day, Kurdish celebration<br />
Happy Nawroz to all Kawa’s nation<br />
When I say Nawroz is our day<br />
I tell the world that we have history<br />
Our history is clear, full of sacrifice<br />
That’s why I see that the future is bright<br />
</blockquote> In the same year, I wrote another poem that was similar to this one, which will be published in my book, <em>Son of Mountains,</em> in the section where I tell one of my Nawroz celebration stories.<br />
here is that poem:<br />
<blockquote> Behold the lily (<em>nergz</em>)<br />
With the sweet scent of spring.<br />
How wonderful the spring <br />
That starts with Nawroz.<br />
Nawroz tells me of history<br />
Shows me the way to victory<br />
Teaches me the meaning of freedom<br />
And of living proudly with dignity.<br />
</blockquote>3. Nawroz is a time to breathe<br />
For many Kurds, winter is like house arrest: snow and cold weather do not allow them to come out of their houses, especially in the villages in the mountain areas. Patiently they wait for spring, so they can see the <em>nergz</em> and celebrate Nawroz, and for all the Kurds Nawroz is a time to have some fun and let out some of the sadness from the unfairness and the unjust rulers. That’s why everyone waits for Nawroz—to let some stress out, to look at the fire, to smell the <em>nergz</em>, to listen to the patriotic songs. It is the great “stress reliever” and a big inspiration for us about the future. <br />
For us, it’s not that the Nawroz fire has anything to do with the Persian fire worshipers, we never look at it that way. For us, this is the fire that Kawa opened to tell people that Zuhak is over, and to bring the glad tidings of victory; the fire that burned the castle of injustice and ended the dark day of history; our way of telling the world that we are a nation, we have the longest history, we exist! Look at us, look at the fire, it will burn whoever denies us our rights or our existence, our nationality, our history, whoever kills our youth and destroys our land. Until now, and forever, Kurds will celebrate Nawroz as the beginning of the new life, as our national and independence day, in memory of Kawa’s victory. Happy Nawroz! [NAWROZ PIROZ BE!]<br />
* Here Yassin requested that I find the Kurdish year for 2008. According to the <a href="http://www.kurdistanica.com/english/culture/ncharacters/calendar/calendar.html">Encyclopedia of Kurdistan</a> :<br />
“The Standard Kurdish Calendar starts at 612 BC. According to this if we use the Georgian [Gregorian] calendar as a reference for our calculation then we realise that the simple equation will give us the correct Kurdish year on the 20th or 21 March depending on the Georgian [Gregorian] year; like:<br />
1+ (Actual Georgian [Gregorian] Year + 611) = Kurdish Year”<br />
So 2008 is Kurdish year 2620. The first day of spring (and thus Nawroz) in 2008/2620 is March 20.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3872871571320054609.post-35497536092297215112011-06-17T10:24:00.001-07:002011-06-17T10:24:47.525-07:00Names of Corduene Kings<h3 class="post-title entry-title"> Names of Corduene Kings </h3><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgbt75S3nLZECHdrSRb7_HFQxAimIX1pDuX46WYfdlv8sUWtJkUamP1mAahyphenhyphenGn2JVnXJf4jPPu6gLdmn7SL23yNEssfxPhDxi-xOZtglAB_lrsOShvK9h6YfBWfYRrMb6XGr_hCWlA_7yGw/s1600/Manisarus.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="133" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgbt75S3nLZECHdrSRb7_HFQxAimIX1pDuX46WYfdlv8sUWtJkUamP1mAahyphenhyphenGn2JVnXJf4jPPu6gLdmn7SL23yNEssfxPhDxi-xOZtglAB_lrsOShvK9h6YfBWfYRrMb6XGr_hCWlA_7yGw/s320/Manisarus.png" width="320" /></a></div><br />
Corduene was a kingdom in ancient Kurdistan, often been neglected by scholars. Among their notable kings were Zarbienus and Manisarus, whose etymology of names discloses the nature of the Iranic dialect they spoke: a middle Scythian dialect, the same as neighbouring Adiabene to the south of the kingdom.<br />
<br />
<b>Zarbienus</b>, also recorded as Zarbiene, and Zarbien, (early-mid 1st c. BC), made overtures to Appius Claudius, when the latter was staying at Antiocheia, wishing to shake off the yoke of Tigranes. He was informed against, however, and was assassinated with his wife and children before the Romans entered Armenia. When Lucullus arrived he celebrated his funeral rites with great pomp, setting fire to the funeral pile with his own hand, and had a sumptuous monument erected to him. His name is comprised of two components, the first part is ''zar'', middle Iranic development for <b>gold/golden</b>, deriving from the old Avestan and Scythian ''zaranya''. The old Persian equivalent of zaranya was daranya, while later on, Zar entered as a loan into Persian and replaced the original old Persian daranya.<br />
Plutarch has even recorded the name as Zerbienus, which reflects the typical middle and new Kurdish development of /a>e/.<br />
It is a cognate with name of the eastern Scythians (Sakas) queen, "Zarina". She led a rebellion by Scythians and Parthians against the Median King Cyaxares, who according to Herodotus had recovered his kingdom through intoxicating Scythian nobles; (that is after Scythian emperor Madius had counqered the Medes). The name of Zarina which means ''golden'', is still used for Kurdish females. The name has also been borrowed into Persian.<br />
<br />
<b>Manisarus </b>(ca. 115 AD) took control over Armenia and Mesopotamia; therefor Osroes, the Parthian king, declared war against him; Manisarus sided with Romans. There are some coins extant, which are assigned to Manisarus. The etymology of his name is explained by linguist and orientalist Ferdinand Justi (author of "Kurdische Grammatik"), in his valuable book "Iranisches Namenbuch" to mean <b>"unique and unparalleled lord/master"</b>.<br />
The image above, shows an old drawing from one of the silver coins of the King Manisarus. Note King's headband (or diadem), typical for Scythian kings, such as King <a href="http://landofkarda.blogspot.com/2010/05/scythian-dynasty-of-adiabene.html">Izates II of Adiabene</a>.<br />
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</span>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3872871571320054609.post-80331599856384012912011-06-17T10:22:00.001-07:002011-06-17T10:22:35.353-07:00Memê Alan or "Mam The Alanian"<h3 class="post-title entry-title"> Memê Alan or "Mam The Alanian" </h3><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="http://kurdistan.nu/dk-yazilar/arif_sevinc_album-filer/mem_u_zin.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="224" src="http://kurdistan.nu/dk-yazilar/arif_sevinc_album-filer/mem_u_zin.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br />
With regard to the Alans (a wellknown Scythian people), we have previously mentioned the large Alanian tribal confederations among the Kurds, such as Alans of Piranshahr and Sardasht south of lake Urmia or the Alan aristocracy who ruled for centuries over what is nowadays Iranian province of Kurdistan (Ardalan, or Ard-Alan), immidiately to south of the former.<br />
We have also referred to the name of the mythological Kurdish hero of the Epic of Mem u Zin, "Memê Alan" (or Mam the Alan). This classic love story is considered to be the épopée of the Kurdish literature. One more interesting fact with regard to the story is pointed out by the French orientalist and expert on Kurdish literature, Roger Lescot. He rightfully identified the origin of the story in a narration by Chares of Mytilene, a Greek historian of the 4th century BC. Chares informs us that the love story which is about a prince and a Scythian princess, is originally recited by the Scythians of Caucasus mountains.<br />
<div><br />
</div><div>It is noteworthy that the story narrated by Chares was for a few decades ago thought to be related to Zoroastrian tradititions. Howerver, it is now believed to be originally a Scythian-Median love story.</div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3872871571320054609.post-61175095413596496592011-06-17T10:19:00.000-07:002011-06-17T10:19:22.978-07:00Shameran<h3 class="post-title entry-title"> Shameran </h3><a href="http://www.saradistribution.com/foto2/shamaranormarnas123.jpg"><img alt="" border="0" src="http://www.saradistribution.com/foto2/shamaranormarnas123.jpg" style="cursor: pointer; float: right; height: 300px; margin: 0pt 0pt 10px 10px; width: 200px;" /></a><br />
<div><br />
</div>Shameran is name of the goddess of wisedom and guardian of the secrets in Kurdish mythology.<br />
<div>It's name literally means ''king of the snakes''. Shameran is thought to have an anthropomorphic figure with a female head on a snake body, the way she is often depicted and her pictures are traditionally hung on bedroom walls of Kurdish girls.</div><div><br />
</div><div>Shameran which can be compared with the Greek ''Mermeid'', exactly corresponds with the snake-legged goddess of earth, Api (<a href="http://landofkarda.blogspot.com/2010/05/scythian-mythology-and-yazdanism.html">see here</a>), in the Scythian (ancient Kurds) mythology.</div><div><br />
</div><div>Other spellings of the name include: Shamaran, Shahmeran, Shahmaran and alike.</div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3872871571320054609.post-23964769246975945562011-06-17T10:13:00.001-07:002011-06-17T10:13:47.456-07:00Buke Barane<h3 class="post-title entry-title"> Buke Barane </h3><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgucfp9Cvk4TTeBnQpgqyL-jIcjzzRcYdV8DFc-9k4xVhj74yECApHCjhn6PgAEcbA3OG_hDLp5gOteO40fUlg4AqAm1kNKyv7_kp9TxFCo93kcbRdpwatcCd3SWc7lyOO83l6q1cYIQpuG/s1600-h/Rain_cloud_swifts_creek_1.JPG"><img alt="Kurdish festivals, Kurdish traditions, Buka Barana" border="0" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5261921571252743378" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgucfp9Cvk4TTeBnQpgqyL-jIcjzzRcYdV8DFc-9k4xVhj74yECApHCjhn6PgAEcbA3OG_hDLp5gOteO40fUlg4AqAm1kNKyv7_kp9TxFCo93kcbRdpwatcCd3SWc7lyOO83l6q1cYIQpuG/s200/Rain_cloud_swifts_creek_1.JPG" style="cursor: pointer; float: right; height: 134px; margin: 0pt 0pt 10px 10px; width: 200px;" /></a><br />
Buke Barane is a traditional Kurdish festival celebrated in days of drought, when there is no rain to break the thirst of the fields. The term ''Buke Barane'' (pron: buka barana) means ''Bride of the Rain'' or ''Rain Bride'' and with no doubt represents an ancient deity of the rain.<br />
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Although depending on the vast geography of Kurdistan there are several regional variations of the festival , but in general they are essentially the same custom and share the same purpose.<br />
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The most common version of the festival is as following. people make a doll out of two or more beams and dress it up like a bride in beautiful clothes. dependeing on the region a young girl or a young man/boy holds up and carries the rain-bride in her/his hands. Then the bride is accompanied by a crowd of youngsters and children; they follow her house by house in the town or in the village. At every door they sing a hymn which partially is:<br />
<br />
''Buke barane awî dewé,<br />
Awî néw genmanî dewé<br />
chorchorey soybanî dewé...''<br />
that is :<br />
''The rain-bride wants water,<br />
she wants it for the cereal fields,<br />
she wants to see the rain overflowing the roofs...''<br />
<br />
By this they expect one of the family members of the house they knocking its door to pour a bucket of water on the rain-bride; and to get some gifts (as booty) for the youngsters accopmpannying the rain-bride.<br />
At the end they all gather somewhere out of the town or the village and pray for the rain. Finnaly they move towards a nearby river and throw the rain-bride into the river.<br />
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As said above this festival which likely has analogues in some other cultures across the world, is rooted in rituals of the old days.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3872871571320054609.post-19777914526441118872011-06-17T10:09:00.000-07:002011-06-17T10:09:09.608-07:00Ardashir and the Kurds<h3 class="post-title entry-title"> Ardashir and the Kurds </h3><a href="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/b/b0/Taq-1.png"><img alt="" border="0" src="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/b/b0/Taq-1.png" style="cursor: pointer; float: right; height: 428px; margin: 0pt 0pt 10px 10px; width: 252px;" /></a>One of the most interesting and important episodes of the Book of deeds of Ardashir son of Babak is his adventures with the Kurds (ca 220s AD). <br />
<div><br />
Ardashir's mother, like Nizami Ganjavi's mother was of Kurdish descent. Ardawan, the last emperor of Parthians in a letter calls Ardashir ''a Kurd and raised by Kurds''.<br />
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</div><div>With regards to Kurds, book of deeds of Ardashir elaborates Ardashir's attack on kingdom of Corduene, that is the northern Mesopotamia from lake Urmia to Euphrates; In this battle Madig king of Kurds, severely defeats Ardashir. Later Ardashir after having prepared a large army, rushes upon the Kurds and surprizes them with a night attack and finally defeates the Kurds after facing a severe resistance. Ardashir sends all the booty he collected from this battle to Pars.</div><div><br />
On the road the army of Haftan-bokht, ''the king of the Kirm'' (i.e. Kirmanshah), struck against them, seized the entire wealth, property, and portable lodges from those cavalry soldiers of Ardashir, and carried them into Guzaran (modern Kuzaran, located to the west of city of Kermanshah and to the east of Sarpol Zahab), one of the boroughs of Gular (modern Kalar, to the north of Kuzaran), where Kirmanshah had its abode. </div><div><br />
</div><div>''Kirm'' is the old and middle Iranic for ''serpent''. The people of Kurdistan were known as people of serpent (by ethnic Hayqs of Armenia as ''Mar'', serpent, snake); Indeed, in Assyrian records the gate to the road to the Kimmerian was named ''Musasir'', which literally means ''Exit of Serpent''.</div><br />
Ardashir then entertained this idea: "I shall go to Armenia (northeastern Anatolia, north of lake Van) and Ataropatgan (or Atropatene; east of lake Urmia), because Yazdan-kard (Domitianus) of Shaharzur (now Suleimania) has with many soldiers and heroes, passed beyond the frontiers of Shaharzur which at that time was part of the the kingdom of Garmian and its capital was at Kirkuk, concluded a treaty with the ruler of the land of shah of Kirm (or land of Kirmanshah), and become his ally." But as soon as Ardashir heard of the assault and victory of the sons of Haftan-bokht towards his (Ardashir's) army, he decided to firstly, put in order the affairs at Pars and become fearless of the enemies, and after that begin to meddle with other enemies."<br />
It is mentioned also that the kingdom of Kirm was able to recruit significant numbers of troops from ''the land of Sind'', that is the area of Duhok and Zaxo.<br />
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<br />
Then Ardashir dispatched an innumerable army with chieftains to the battle of Kirmanshah. The army of Kirmanshah deposited their entire wealth, riches, property, and portable lodges in the citadel and fortress of Guzaran, and privately took refuge in mountain cavities. And the cavalry of Ardashir had no knowledge thereof, so they, on reaching the foot of the fortress of Gular, blockaded the citadel. When night fell, the army of Kirmanshah attacked them, committed bloodshed, killed many of Ardashir's troops, and seized from them horses, saddles, saddle-tackles, property, and portable lodges. With lamentation and dishonor, the troops returned to Ardashir in a disgraceful condition and unarmed...<br />
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Ardashir became much distressed, and consequently, invited to his capital all his troops from different cities and territories, and engaged himself with a large army to battle against Kirmanshah.<br />
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When he arrived at the fortress of Guzaran, the whole army of Kirmanshah had encamped itself inside the fortress, so he too encamped his army round the outer walls of the fortress.<br />
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The Shah of Kirm, Haftan-bokht, had seven sons, and each of them was appointed by him governor of a city with one thousand men under him. At this juncture, one of the sons, who was in Arvastan (Arabia; west of Euphrates), came by the passage of a sea, with a, large army composed of soldiers from Arabia and Mazenderan, and stood against Ardashir in battle.<br />
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The army of Kirmanshah, which had been inside the fortress, completely marched out, and vehemently struggled and fought with Ardashir's troops, many being killed on both sides. When the army of Kirmanshah came out of the fortress, it took such a by-road that it became impossible for any of Ardashir's troops to go out of the camp or to bring in any food for himself or fodder for his horses, and, consequently the satiety of all men and animals was changed into want of food and helplessness.<br />
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When Mitrok, son of Anoshepat, an inhabitant of Zarham in Pars, heard that Ardashir was without provision near the capital of land of Kirmanshahan , and obtained no victory over its army; he accoutered his troops and heroes, marched towards the residence of Ardashir, and carried away all the wealth and riches of Ardashir's treasure.<br />
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Ardashir, hearing of such violation on the part of Mitrok and other men of Pars, reflected upon it for a while thus: "I ought to postpone the battle with Kirmanshah, and then go to fight out a battle with Mitrok." He, therefore, summoned all his forces back to his quarters, deliberated with their commanders, first sought the means of delivering himself and his army.<br />
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That very moment a long arrow, dispatched from the fortress, came down and pierced, as far as its feathers, through the roasted lamb that was on the table.<br />
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On the arrow it was written as follows: "This arrow is darted by the troops of the lord of the glorious Dragon; we ought not to kill a great man like you, so we have struck that roasted lamb," Ardashir, having observed the state of things, disencamped his army and withdrew from the place.<br />
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The army of Kirmanshah hastened after Ardashir, and hemmed in his men again in such a manner that Ardashir's army could not proceed further. So Ardashir himself passed away singly by the sea-coast<br />
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Ardashir marched again towards Ardashir-Gadman, undertook the battle with Mitrôk, son of Anoshepat, killed Mitrok, and took possession of his territory, land, wealth and property.<br />
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Then Ardashir disguised himself as a merchant from Kkorasan and enetred the castle of Kirmanshah and poisoned him by a trick.<br />
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Ardashir commanded that the fortress should be razed to the ground and demolished, while on its site he ordered the city which they call Guzaran to be erected. In that quarter he caused an Atash-i Warharan to be enthroned. He loaded on the backs of one thousand camels the wealth, property, gold, and silver contained in the fortress, and dispatched them to Gobar. Then Ardashir installed a friendly and trusted vassal kingdom over the area of Kirmanshahan, which lasted from 226 to 380 AD. and is known as Kayusid or Kavusakan. A number of tombs cut into living rock in the mountains of the Kermanshah region is believed to date back from the House of Kayus. The most famous carvings in Kermanshah are at Taq Bustan believed to be the historic site of the dynasty.<br />
<div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: -webkit-sans-serif; line-height: 19px;"></span></div><div>The book of deeds of Ardashir further mentions his battle in Mokristan (Mokriyan, abode of Mokri Kurds, to the northeast of Garmiyan) and Barjan (abode of Barzan Kurds, between Garmiyan and Sind). </div><div><br />
</div><div>Although the topography of the story mentioned in the book of deeds of Ardashir precisely fits that of geography of Kurdistan, some biased western scholars tried in past to falsify this remarkable part of Kurdish history by linking it to the dry and uninhabitable deserts of eastern Iran, however it was protested by intelligent Kurdish intellectuals such as Mihrdad Izady who in his great and precious article ''QALEH-I YAZDIGIRD Cultural Treasure of the Kurdish Past'' (1993) clarifies the history of a mountain castle in Kirmanshahan to the ancient castle of king of Kirm in Guzaran. </div><div><br />
</div>(Image: Ardashir is believed to be standing here in this relief at Taq-e Bostan. On the left is an Iranic Izad (god), on the right is Kayus of Kirmanshah, and below him is Haftanbokht.)Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3872871571320054609.post-8656207334974579632011-06-17T10:07:00.000-07:002011-06-17T10:07:04.720-07:00Ziryab, the great Kurdish polymath<h3 class="post-title entry-title"> Ziryab, the great Kurdish polymath </h3><a href="http://www.juntadeandalucia.es/averroes/%7E14700596/departamentos/imagenes/ziryab.gif"><img alt="" border="0" src="http://www.juntadeandalucia.es/averroes/%7E14700596/departamentos/imagenes/ziryab.gif" style="cursor: pointer; float: right; height: 240px; margin: 0pt 0pt 10px 10px; width: 200px;" /></a><span><span><span><span><div><div><br />
</div><div>Ziryab, (also spelled as Ziriab or Ziriyab) (789-857) was a polymath: a poet, musician, singer,cosmetologist, fashion designer, celebrity, trendsetter, strategist, astronomer, botanist and geographer at the Umayyad court of Córdobain Islamic Spain. He first achieved notoriety at the Abbasid court in Baghdad, as a performer and student of the great musician and composer, Ishaq al-Mawsili. Ziryab was a gifted pupil of Ishaq al-Mawsili. He had to leave Baghdad when his skills as a musician surpassed those of his teacher. He moved to Córdoba in southern Spain and was accepted as court musician in the court of Abd al-Rahman II of the Umayyad Dynasty. </div><div><br />
</div><div>Ziryab left Baghdad some time after the death of the Caliph al-Amîn in 813 and traveled first to Sham (Syria), then to Ifriqiyya (Tunisia), where he lived at the Aghlabid court of Ziyadat Allah (ruled 816-837). Ziryab fell out with Ziyadat Allah but was invited to Al-Andalus by the Umayyad prince, al-Hakam I. He found on arrival in 822 that the prince had died, but the prince's son, Abd ar-Rahman II, renewed his father's invitation. Ziryab settled in Córdoba, where he soon became even more celebrated as the court's aficionado of food, fashion, singing and music. He introduced standards of excellence in all these fields as well as setting new norms for elegant and noble manners. He was an intimate companion of the prince and established a school of music that trained singers and musicians which influenced musical performance for at least two generations after him. In the 9th Century he introduced the New Year celebration based on the Iranian holiday Newroz to the courts ofAndalusia in Spain and thence to Europe.</div><div><br />
</div><div>Ziryab is said to have improved the 'ud by adding a fifth pair of strings, and using an eagle's beak or quill instead of a wooden pick. He is said to have created a unique and influential style of musical performance, and written songs that were performed in Spain for generations. He was a great influence on Spanish music, and is considered the founder of the Andalusian music traditions of North Africa and the Middle East. Zyriab is thought to have codified the disparate elements of Arab poetic traditions of qasidah, mwashah and zajal. Abd al-Rahman II was a great patron of the arts and Zyriab was given a great deal of freedom. He established one of the first schools of music. He was a great virtuoso on the 'ud and an amazing singer. Ziryab also introduced musical instruments—notably the Persian lute that became the Spanish guitar—as well as passionate songs, tunes and dances of Persia and Mesopotamia that later, mixed with Gypsy influence, evolved into the famed Spanish flamenco. Ziryab established a music conservatory at the court of Abdel-Rahman at Cordoba. (The German scholarly book "Moorish Architecture" by Barrucand states that Ziryab also introduced good taste, fine court manners and even new hair cuts into Spain).</div><div><br />
</div><div>Ziryab is said to have had a lasting influence on fashion, bringing styles from the Middle East to Al-Andaluz, including sophisticated styles of clothing based on seasonal and daily timings. In winter, for example, costumes were made essentially from warm cotton or wool items usually in dark colours and summer garments were made of cool and light costumes involving materials such as cotton, silk and flax in light and bright colours. Brilliant colours for these clothes were produced in tanneries and dye works which the Muslim world perfected its production, for example, in 12th century Fes, Morocco, there were more than 86 tanneries and 116 dye works.[19]In daily timing Ziryab suggested different clothing for mornings, afternoons and evenings. Henry Terrace, a French historian, commented on the fashion work of Ziryab; "He introduced winter and summer dresses, setting exactly the dates when each fashion was to be worn. He also added dresses of half season for intervals between seasons. Through him, the luxurious dress of the Orient was introduced in Spain. Under his influence a fashion industry was set up, producing coloured striped fabric and coats of transparent fabric, which is still found in Morocco today.", though Terrace goes on to caution "Without a doubt, a lone man could not achieve this transformation. It is rather a development which shook the Muslim world in general, although historic legend attributes all these changes to Ziryab and his promoter, Abd-Al-Rahman II" Ziryab is known to have invented an early toothpaste, which he popularized throughout Islamic Spain. The exact ingredients of this toothpaste are not currently known, but it was reported to have been both "functional and pleasant to taste." He also introduced under-arm deodorants and "new short hairstyles leaving the neck, ears and eyebrows free," as well as shaving for men.For women, he opened a beauty parlour or “cosmetology school” near Alcázar, where he introduced a "shorter, shaped cut, with a fringe on the forehead and the ears uncovered." He also taught "the shaping of eyebrows and the use of depilatories for removing body hair", and he introduced new perfumes and cosmetics.</div><div><br />
</div><div>He also "revolutionized the local cuisine," by introducing new fruit and vegetables such as asparagus, and by introducing the three-course meal, insisting that meals should be served in three separate courses consisting of soup, the main course, and dessert. He also introduced the use ofcrystal as a container for drinks, which was more effective than metal goblets. He was an arbiter of fashion and taste. Ziryab's influence is felt to this day, especially in music and food. Prior to his arrival in al-Andalus in 822, there had been no style in food presentation since the Roman Empire. Food was served plainly on platters on bare tables, much as remains the "traditional" style in the middle east to this day. Ziryab changed that. He brought with him many dishes from Baghdad, introduced fine tablecloths and glassware instead of metal goblets, and developed a new order of service for the table. This "more elegant, better-bred and modern style" became established in al-Andalus, thence spread across the Pyrenees to Europe, and became the standard service we still use today. Hence the banquet will be served according to the precepts of Ziryab, and so will differ from the "traditional" style of serving one associates with Islamic food.</div></div></span></span></span></span>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3872871571320054609.post-78451333503471890042011-06-17T10:03:00.000-07:002011-06-17T10:03:22.039-07:00On The Kassites And Kurds<h3 class="post-title entry-title"> On The Kassites And Kurds<img height="349" id="il_fi" src="http://www.allempires.com/forum/uploads/32038/Kassite_Empire.jpg" style="padding-bottom: 8px; padding-right: 8px; padding-top: 8px;" width="463" /> </h3>It has long been suggested by many scholars that Kassites were, at least partially, ancestors of the Kurds. They base this claim on historical migrations, and the fact that after having conquered Mesopotamia, renamed their empire to ''Karduniash'' (land of Kardun).<br />
I'm intending to explore this claim on linguistic bases. <br />
Actually, when it comes to linguistic grounds, our information concerning the Kassite language is really negligible. There is nothing known of the Kassite language except for a dozen of lexemes, mostly understood through available Akkadian equivalents:<br />
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janzu/janzi = king<br />
iash/ash/yashu = earth, country<br />
Bugai? = Prince or god?<br />
Sakr = Chakr/Charx, wheel? chariot?, sakrumash = charioteer<br />
kamsu= bronze component of harness?<br />
(a)tanah = sagarakti = napsuru = to sigh, tired, save<br />
prtl = a medicinal herb<br />
kudurru = boundary, frountier<br />
kurigalzu = herder of the folk<br />
mashu/bashkhu = god<br />
saribu= foot<br />
sirpi = brown (pl. Sirpami)<br />
minzir= dotted, (pl. Minzamur)<br />
dakash = star<br />
sagegi = heaven<br />
ilulu = heaven<br />
miriash = earth<br />
turukhna/turuhna = wind, storm<br />
nu (or kur)-la = 'king'<br />
mali = man<br />
meli = slave<br />
kukla = slave<br />
barkhu/marhu = head<br />
khameru/hamir = foot<br />
akriyaš = agriya-s "(running) in front?",<br />
timiraš = "black?"<br />
nashbu = people, population<br />
hashmar = falcon<br />
simbar = young people<br />
shimdi = to give <br />
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As seen above, it appears that Kassites (like many ancient peoples) spoke two languages among themselves, probably one belonging to their ruling class and the other to the oridinary people.<br />
Kassite language(s) is described as a language isolate, meaning it had no relatives among other known languages. Anyways, some words sound similar to Hurro-Urartian (and hence Kurdish). For example the Kassite word ''khameru'' which meant ''foot'', is somehow similar to Urartian ''kuri, (Kurdish ''qul'': foot). Or the Kassite ''meli'', meaning ''slave'', sounds similar to Urartian ''bura'' (Kurdish ''bora'': commoner). Though still Urartian equivalents are way closer to Kurdish (almost identical). <br />
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Regarding the frequency of the Kassite names in the toponymy of Kurdistan, it is known that Kassite personal names, although used throughout ancient Kurdistan, from southernmost regions to the northernmost regions; but in a very low scale, not at all comparable to the huge amount of Hurro-Urartian ones.<br />
Returning to historical evidence, the Kassites had to a large extent assimilated into the culture of their Bybylonian subjects; moreover, after the defeat of their empire the Kassite people had reduced to a small local kingdom to the south of Zamua and west of Ellipi. Later they are recorded as Cissians, along with the Elymaeans, as nomadic tribes of south-easternmost regions of ancient Kurdistam.<br />
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To sum up, the Kassite language's contribution to the formation of the Kurdish language, -at least at present, due to lack of sufficient knowledge on Kassite- seems to be minimal.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0